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Senate

The Senate met in executive session at 10 o'clock a.m., and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Father of all, whose righteous laws condemn and will at last break whatsoever bars Thy children from abundant life: In these days freighted with destiny, for whose decisions the future will judge us, by Thine enabling might may Thy servants here in the ministry of public affairs maintain their integrity unsullied by personal animosities, prejudices, or selfish ambitions.

And now as there looms the hour when for men and nations comes the moment to decide, to whatever decision come those who here speak for this free land, this day in a choice between frowning risks on either side, may those who give their consent and those who withhold it alike be sustained by the supreme satisfaction that, in a grave crisis, they have done their full duty, and that in the face of trembling and fearful humanity their vote represents their patriotic judgment deserving well of the Republic.

We ask it in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, as in legislative session, there be a morning hour for 5 minutes, at the end of which time I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE JOURNAL

On the request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, September 20, 1963, and Monday, September 23, 1963, was dispensed with.

DEATH OF TILLMAN B. HUSKEY, CHIEF CABINETMAKER IN THE SENATE

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on August 24, just 1 day before his birthday,

Tillman B. Huskey, Sr., who was the chief cabinetmaker on the Senate side, passed away.

Mr. Huskey served this body for nearly 30 years. I wish to take note of his passing, because he was among those whom the public never sees, but who so faithfully serve the Senate.

PC

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last week, after the completion of my remarks on the test ban treaty, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] placed in the RECORD 36 questions he would have asked me with respect to this treaty if he had been on the floor when I concluded.

Inasmuch as it was necessary for me to leave, to go back to Missouri for the remainder of the week, in order to fulfill several longstanding engagements, I was not in a position to answer.

Upon my return to town yesterday, however, I worked on answers to these questions; and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed, together with the questions, at this point in the RECORD.

I take this opportunity to commend the Senator from South Carolina for the many long hours he has spent in studying this matter. We agree on many points; on others, we do not. I wish we could agree on all, especially inasmuch as I know of the complete sincerity of his position.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina also put in the RECORD the transcript of a television program of April 28 in which I participated. That program was conducted at a time when the Preparedness Subcommittee was giving consideration to the so-called comprehensive treaty—one far different from the treaty that is under consideration today, in that it involved an onsite inspection agreement to supervise underground testing.

There being no objection, the questions and the answers were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. Question. The Senator is in a unique position, since he is a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee, and signed the reports of both committees. I believe the Senator from Missouri has attested that the

factual data in the Preparedness Subcommittee's report is accurate. Is that correct?

Answer. As I stated in my additional views that are included in the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee report, "To the best of my knowledge the factual data contained in the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee is correct. But I believe the findings and conclusions are overly pessimistic as to the effect of the treaty on our national security."

2. Question. Does the Senator subscribe to the opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated in its report, that, and I quote: "But exclusive, or excessive, reliance on military considerations could undermine national security by encouraging comparable military efforts by others, thereby strengthening the destabilizing forces adrift in the world, possibly creating new ones."

Answer. Everyone agrees that military considerations are very important. However, no one believes that military factors are the sole considerations. For example, I have expressed concern particularly because of the likely proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in the world. While I do not believe that this treaty by itself will stop such proliferation, I do believe that the treaty could be a small step in that direction.

3. Question. I notice that the Senator states that "unless there can be some understanding among the growing number of nations that will have the weapon, a nuclear holocaust is only a question of time." Does the Senator mean to imply that armaments, rather than human weaknesses, cause wars?

Answer. Both armaments and human weakness are required for war. It is unfortunately true also that armaments and human strength are both required to maintain a just peace. It is the kind and proliferation of armaments, not the existence of armaments, that are now in issue.

4. Question. The United States has maintained a level of armaments over recent years unequaled in all history. Would the Senator not agree that these armaments have been the very factor that has prevented nuclear war?

Answer. They have been a mighty important factor. I believe that these armaments have been important in causing the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and in preventing many other Communist adventures, especially in Europe and perhaps the Far East. The existence of U.S. military power, known to the Soviets, has in my opinion prevented Soviet conduct which might well have led to war.

5. Question. Would the Senator not agree that the only way in which one can be sure of preventing nuclear war, so long as the Communists maintain their goal of world domination, is to keep an overwhelming superiority in strategic military power?

16900

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

Answer. It is vital that the United States maintain its capability to destroy the Soviet Union if a retaliatory strike is required.

6. Question. The Senator from Missouri has correctly pointed out that the military disadvantages of the treaty to the Soviet Union must also be considered, along with the military disadvantages to the United States. Would not the Senator from Missouri agree that in assessing the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, that the starting point, in terms of technology, of both the United States and the Soviet Union, is largely determinative of the degree of disadvantage from prohibition of testing in a particular environment?

Answer. As I understand the question, I agree that the degree of disadvantage imposed on a nation by the treaty is determined, to some extent, by where that nation is now as compared with the other in terms of nuclear technology. There is a tendency for progress to come harder to the nation ahead—breaking new ground. For example, advancements in yield-to-weight ratios become more difficult as one approaches the theoretical limits. Thus the Soviets—behind in medium- and low-yield weapons—could, if unlimited testing were allowed, be expected to make relatively rapid progress in those areas. Under the treaty, however, Soviet progress in these areas can be expected to be slower.

7. Question. The Senator has pointed out that the Soviets will be unable to test for blackout phenomena after the treaty goes into effect, just as will the United States. Isn't it a fact, however, that the Soviets specifically tested for blackout phenomena, and particularly as it applies to ABM systems, in the 1961-62 series, but that the United States has made no comparable test?

Answer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the Soviets may possess some information not available to the United States. Dr. Brown, in his testimony added: "Yes, and we have some data that they may not have." Dr. Brown has stated that our tests were comparable to theirs—particularly in that they provided a much broader range of data from which extrapolation can be made with more confidence; that each side has had about the same number of tests, over yield ranges and altitude ranges which are comparable though not identical; that enough has been learned in the United States to verify the existence, nature, and rough dependence of blackout characteristics on yield and altitude, although important details still have not been explored; that the same is probably true in the Soviet Union; that enough is now known in the United States to determine for example how blackout enters, with other factors in the anti-ICBM problem, in determining the optimum radar frequency; and that both sides have done several tests with very extensive instrumentation. Both Dr. Brown and Dr. Bradbury testified that blackout tests were conducted by the United States in 1958 and 1962 and that we have learned enough about the problem to be able to take measures to design around it. Senator SPARKMAN on September 16 dealt with the matter. He referred also to the testimony in executive hearings of Mr. John McCone. I refer the Senate to the same source.

8. Question. Another factor which bears heavily on the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, as I am sure the Senator will agree, is the different strategies of the United States and the Soviets. Since the United States must rely on second strike capabilities, it must test to determine every possible vulnerability in its weapons systems, for to leave one that is unknown could spell disaster in the event of any enemy first strike. Since the Soviets rely on the strategy of a first, or preemptive strike, they do not have to test for the purpose of insuring the invulnerability of their own weapons sys-

tems, but can concentrate on ferreting out one or two vulnerabilities of our weapons systems and the proper weapons design to exploit our weapons systems vulnerabilities that they have found. Does this factor not require, in effect, far more comprehensive nuclear testing for weapons effects and proof tests by the United States to maintain its second strike force than is necessary for the Soviets to advance their first strike force?

Answer. Without regard to what the Soviet strategy actually is, prudence requires the United States to maintain strategic forces capable of surviving any Soviet surprise attack and delivering a devastating counterblow. In this connection, it is important to understand, with as little uncertainty as possible, the phenomena which may bear on the survivability of our systems. As I said on September 17, "While I regret * * * that the United States did not, before now, find the answer to more of the gnawing vulnerability questions, I am convinced that the Soviets, limited as they are by the terms of this treaty, will not be able to change the elemental facts of the strategic nuclear power balance." Our systems are many in number and involve great redundancy in command and control. This being the case, it is most unlikely that any one or two vulnerabilities will be critical. And, it should be noted that, hampered by the test ban, the Soviets will have difficulty estimating the nature of any weaknesses in U.S. systems which may exist.

9. Question. The Senator states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen no need for a 100-megaton bomb. Is the Senator not aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, in fact, recommended that we go ahead with the development of the big bomb?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assured that "the United States, without any future testing, can develop a warhead with a yield of 50 to 60 megatons for B-52 delivery." This size and type weapon, I understand, falls within the range of interest expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the recommendation referred to. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their statement of position on the limited test ban treaty said that "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not regarded as important the attainment of weapons in the 100-megaton range from which the United States will be debarred by the treaty. They feel that the types and numbers of megaton yield weapons available to us now or in the future could give us an adequate capability in the high-yield weapon range." As the report of the Foreign Relations Committee points out: "Even Dr. Edward Teller, a critic of the treaty, recently commented: 'It is not clear to me that these very big yields will result in a substantial advantage for the Russians. * * * In evaluating the consequences of the test ban, I do not place very great importance on the lead which the Russians enjoy in this particular field.'" He has also agreed that we do not need atmospheric testing in order to construct larger bombs.

10. Question. Isn't it also a fact that General LeMay recommended the development of a big bomb as early as 1954, but that he was refused?

Answer. General LeMay testified: "I asked for, the Air Force asked for, a big yield bomb as early as 1954." Testimony also brought out this was a bomb of over 50 megatons.

11. Question. Isn't it a fact that one of the reasons that the recommendation of the military for development of a big bomb has never been approved lies in the fact that the defense policy of the Nation is based on a shift in reliance from manned aircraft, which could deliver a very high yield weapon, to ballistic missiles, in which we do not now have a capability of delivering the necessary weight to achieve the very high yield?

Answer. I am told that the reasons for no decision to develop a very big bomb are

many. The principal one is the absence of a military role in which such a weapon was superior to smaller weapons. It must be borne in mind that, as weapons to use against military targets in a retaliation role, larger numbers of smaller weapons are to be preferred on a cost-effectiveness basis, and also because the smaller delivery systems are easier to harden or make mobile. With respect to the shift in emphasis to missile delivery, it should be remembered both that manned aircraft will have an important role in the foreseeable future and that, without atmospheric testing, larger warheads could be developed and stockpiled for our bombers as well as our future missile systems.

12. Question. The Preparedness Subcommittee report, in which the Senator from Missouri attests as to the accuracy of the facts reported as a fact that, and I quote: "The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions. Without such knowledge it is unlikely that a realistic assessment can be made of the military value of such weapons." Would the Senator not agree that the Soviets have a distinct lead over the United States in this area, and that we do not now have the necessary information from which to assess the military potential of the 100-megaton bomb when used against us.

Answer. This part of the subcommittee report was a conclusion, and by the testimony a disputed fact. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated that "although they have done more high yield tests, those were not effects tests. Their geography, and the associated activity does not indicate to me that they are effects tests." Here again, I refer the Senate to the testimony in executive hearings by Mr. John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. With respect to the adequacy of information at our disposal, I repeat my regrets, stated to the Senate on September 17, that we did not, before now, take more steps to reduce our uncertainties relating to the survivability of our missile force. But I am advised that we do have a great deal of information from which to assess the military potential of a 100-megaton bomb used against us; and that the Soviets know no more than we do about any vulnerabilities that may exist.

13. Question. Would the Senator not agree, that regardless of whether the United States would decide, after acquisition of sufficient information on which to make a realistic evaluation, to build a 100-megaton bomb for its own arsenal or not, that it is a major disadvantage for the enemy to have a major weapon of which he knows the military potential, and for the United States to know existence of the weapon, but to be precluded from ascertaining with some degree of certainty its military potential?"

Answer. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets know more than we do about the military potential of a 100-megaton bomb. Neither side has tested one. The 60-megaton test by the Soviets was a weapons, not effects, test. As for the implication of a Soviet technological lead in the very high yield range, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that technological superiority is only one aspect of the net security which must take into account the number of weapons, variety of delivery systems and the magnitude of nuclear plant and stockpile: "As to net superiority in ability to inflict damage on the enemy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States at present is clearly ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the ability to wage strategic nuclear war." We have data from which we can estimate the effects of very large weapons.

14. Question. The Senator is quite pessimistic about the ability of either the United States or the Soviet Union to develop an effective ABM system. According to the information we now have, the Soviets have

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16901

deployed an ABM system in one location to which we attribute significant effectiveness in defending against IRBM's, including the Polaris, which incidentally are not missiles which can be salvoed, but we attribute very little effectiveness to this system against ICBM's. In view of the fact that it is possible that the vulnerabilities of our missiles in silos could possibly be exploited by some weapons effects of which we are not now fully knowledgeable, to say the least, would the Senator not agree that under some circumstances the present Soviet technological capabilities in the ABM field are of large significance?

Answer. The problems which face us, and presumably the Soviets, in any attempt to develop an ABM system are concentrated, primarily, in nonnuclear areas—in areas unaffected by the treaty (reaction speed, missile performance, traffic handling capacity, and capacity for decoy discrimination). So the question asked is one largely unrelated to the test ban. Nevertheless, with respect to the Soviet ABM position, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee's report did not find that the Soviets have deployed an ABM system which has significant effectiveness in defending against IRBM's. Dr. Brown stated that he does not believe that the Soviets have deployed any installation as good as, certainly not better than, Nike-Zeus. Moreover, with respect to the Polaris missile, it would be mistaken to conclude from the fact that a missile is not salvoed that it has no penetration capability against an ABM system. As the Foreign Relations Committee report points out, penetration capability includes such techniques as multiple warheads, varied trajectories, the use of heavy and light decoys, and so forth. With respect to relative positions in ABM technology, the testimony of Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Brown, and Dr. York is that the relative strength of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the ABM field is comparable and that the United States may be ahead. Further, it must be remembered that even the most ardent ABM supporters did not testify that an ABM system could be counted on to save a nation from lethal harm.

15. Question. As the Senator correctly stated, the Soviets could not, if they abide by the treaty, obtain any more information from ABM testing than could the United States while the treaty was in effect. Is it not true, however, that the Soviets have already performed tests dictated by ABM considerations specifically on the blackout problem, to which the United States had made nothing comparable?

Answer. See my answer to question 7.

16. Question. The Senator stated that "specifically, apprehensions in the ABM field were not borne out, at least to me, in the highly classified intelligence briefings we received." Is it not true that the briefings to which the Senator refers included a specific description of Soviet ABM tests, to which we have performed nothing comparable?

Answer. Dr. Brown compared the United States and U.S.S.R. ABM tests as follows: "The Soviets have said that they have intercepted a missile with a missile. We have intercepted a missile with a missile on numerous occasions. The Soviets have not said—and on my examination of all the available evidence I believe that they have not intercepted a missile with a missile at ICBM ranges, that is at ranges of many thousands, several thousand miles, 4,000 or more. It is not a firm conclusion but it is what I believe. We have intercepted a missile at ICBM ranges, at our test site at Kwajalein. Second, the Soviets have not said that they have intercepted a missile with an interceptor carrying an exploding nuclear warhead. Again, on investigation of the relevant facts, I conclude that they have not. We have not,

either, and I conclude from that that neither we nor they feel that is the most vital part of an antimissile development."

17. Question. Is it not true that the highly complex ABM tests performed by the Soviets could have, and probably did provide valuable information on the ability of an ABM system to operate in a nuclear environment, including radar and communications blackout, and that we do not know the precise results, or the thrust of the knowledge that the Soviets gained thereby?

Answer. The Soviets obviously obtained important blackout information from their tests, as did we from ours. We do not know the precise results of their tests, nor do they know the precise results of ours. It is likely that both sides understand the thrust of the knowledge gained by the other. In this connection, see my answers to questions 7 and 14.

18. Question. Will the Senator from Missouri tell us whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they made their assessment of the treaty, had all of the details of the Soviet ABM tests in their possession, or whether certain significant facts about the tests had never been disclosed to them?

Answer. After reading this question, I checked with the Department of Defense, and am advised by the Department of Defense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had full access to all the information available on Soviet testing.

19. Question. In discussing the question of vulnerabilities of our missile sites, the Senator points out that the Soviets will not be able to make tests to determine vulnerabilities any more than will the United States under the treaty. Once again, we must go back and examine the point from which each side starts if we are to reach an objective evaluation. The U.S. reliance on a second strike strategy, together with the Soviet reliance on a first strike strategy, makes it incumbent on the United States to have a broader spectrum of knowledge on the vulnerabilities of missile sites than the Soviets. Is it not a fact that the Soviets have demonstrated in their tests that they know more about exotic radiation effects than does the United States?

Answer. See my answer to questions 8 and 12.

20. Question. Is it not true that the magnitude and residuality of some electromagnetic phenomena varies substantially according to the time when the nuclear explosion takes place?

Answer. If the phenomena referred to is blackout, I am advised that it probably does vary substantially according to the time of day and magnetic latitude.

21. Question. Is it not true that the United States has generally tested for weapons effects in the atmosphere only at periods when such effects were at a minimum, while the Soviets have tested for the maximum of such effects?

Answer. I am advised that most weapons effects are not sensitive to the time when the explosion takes place. With respect to blackout, it is true that U.S. tests have been conducted at a time of day when the effect would probably be lesser and that the Soviet tests have been conducted at that time of day when the effect would probably be greater. I am also advised, however, because of the physical manifestations of blackout and the methods used to record those manifestations—that is, the instrumentation of the tests—the information gained from a test is likely to be greater if the tests are performed as the United States has scheduled them.

22. Question. Is it not also true that the Soviet tests of very high yield weapons over the Soviet Union demonstrated a very long-range effectiveness of some electromagnetic phenomena against communications circuits?

Answer. As was predicted, high-yield, high-altitude Soviet explosions did affect some communications circuits for a limited period of time.

23. Question. Is it not true that although the time of explosion of the nuclear warhead substantially affects the level of electromagnetic phenomena, even in the same medium where the warhead is detonated, that we have attempted to test the effects of this phenomenon only underground, not even in the medium where the weapon would presumably be detonated, with a very small yield explosion and attempted to extrapolate the results?

Answer. Our experiments directed at blackout and electromagnetic pulse have been conducted in the atmosphere. Certain yield and altitude extrapolations have been required—as would be the case for the Soviets as well.

24. Question. Would the Senator not agree that the Soviets have demonstrated a capability for producing the maximum level and residuality of exotic radiation effects with a very high yield warhead, and that, if their tests were properly instrumented, they had the opportunity to learn much about the effects of these phenomena?

Answer. There is no indication that the very high yield Soviet warhead was exploded at an altitude which would optimize exotic radiation effects. Furthermore, Dr. Brown tested that the test was not instrumented for effects purposes.

25. Question. Would the Senator not agree that in these exotic radiation effects of nuclear explosions could possibly and even probably lie vulnerabilities to our missile sites and the communications and control circuits, as well to our early warning systems?

Answer. It is possible but not probable that radiation effects could render any given missile site, communication and control circuit, or some portion of our early warning system vulnerable in some unassessed way. Secretary McNamara addressed this problem at length in his statement before the Foreign Relations Committee as follows:

"Our missile force is deployed so as to assure that under any conceivable Soviet first strike, a substantial portion of it would remain in firing condition. Most of the land-based portion of the force has been hardened, as well as dispersed. In addition, we have duplicative facilities which will in the future include the capability of launching each individual Minuteman by a signal from airborne control posts. The United States now has a substantial amount of information in this area of hardened missile-site vulnerability. Our knowledge of the Soviet testing program leads us to believe that their uncertainties are at least as great as ours. Uncertainties of this kind, and others—into which we must count uncertainties of the accuracy of Soviet missiles—will continue to be compensated for by conservative designs, wide dispersal and large quantities of missiles.

"Furthermore, the most pessimistic view of these uncertainties suggests a vulnerability ratio for our hardened, dispersed Minuteman sites or less than two sites killed on the average by a single very large-yield Soviet missile. It is clear that the Soviets do not have anything like the number of missiles necessary to knock out our Minutemen force, nor do they appear to have any present plans to acquire such a capacity."

I understand also that, with respect to our early warning system, blackout from a very high yield nuclear explosion would itself be a form of warning.

26. Question. Would not the Senator agree, as is stated in the Preparedness Subcommittee's report, that the Soviets now enjoy a lead in knowledge of high yield weapons effects?

16902

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

Answer. On this point, the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee used the words "probably" and "prudent to assume." With respect to the merits of the point, see my answers to questions 8 and 12.

27. Question. Would not the Senator agree that the knowledge of weapons effects, particularly the exotic radiation effects, and knowledge of the vulnerabilities of our missile silos and communications and control circuits are so closely related that they are for all practical purposes inseparable?

Answer. Yes; and all of these areas are related inseparably to factors such as numbers, diversity, accuracies, and yields of weapons, redundancy of command and control, national strategies, and so on.

28. Question. The Senator from Missouri has quoted the concluding paragraph of the presentation of Gen. Maxwell Taylor for the Joint Chiefs of Staff which states: "It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if adequate safeguards are established, the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization in international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences." Does the Senator believe, as is implied by the statement he quoted, that the treaty will lead to a stabilization of international relations?

Answer. I believe that the treaty could be a step toward, rather than away from, a more stable order in international affairs and a more peaceful environment. No one has suggested that the treaty by itself will lead inevitably toward firm, peaceful international relations. See also my answer to question 33.

29. Question. Does the Senator believe, as this same quotation implies, that the treaty is a move toward a peaceful environment?

Answer. See my answer to question 28.

30. Question. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will cause the Berlin wall to be torn down, so that this destabilizing factor in international relations will disappear?

Answer. No.

31. Question. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will improve the situation in Vietnam caused by Communist aggression?

Answer. No, at least not in the short term.

32. Question. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will eliminate the Communist regime in Cuba, or reduce the all-out efforts of the Communists to subvert Latin America?

Answer. The treaty will not solve the problem of the Communist attempt to penetrate Latin America.

33. Question. In what way, if any, will this treaty lead to the stabilization of international relations and a peaceful environment?

Answer. In my statement to the Senate on September 17, I said that, after advising and consenting to the treaty, the Senate, "together with the other arms of the U.S. Government, should gird for the contest in the new situation. We must do our part, not only to ensure that the four safeguards listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are effectively implemented, but also to maintain the vigilance and strength of the Nation while the small first step which this treaty represents finds its way into the complex of conditions from which the future will be made." I concluded: "With our eyes open, therefore, let us give weight to the fact that this treaty might point the way toward bringing nuclear weapons under some form of satisfactory control; and thereby furnish hope that a just and lasting peace will move out of the shadows into more of the light."

34. Question. Would not the Senator agree that the principal power from whose acquisition of nuclear weapons the greatest danger of nuclear war arises is Communist China?

Answer. Proliferation of a nuclear weapons capability to Communist China will be very unfortunate and dangerous, as would proliferation to certain other nations. China, I would think, would be the most dangerous.

35. Question. This treaty will not prevent the development of nuclear weapons by Red China, will it?

Answer. This treaty alone cannot prevent Red China from developing nuclear weapons. However, in two respects, it may retard that development. By its provisions the treaty prevents the signatories from assisting any nation in carrying on nuclear testing in the prohibited environments. Furthermore, as I see it, no country which is fighting for leadership in the Communist and uncommitted world can be totally oblivious to the sentiments of the over 100 signatories who have already signed this treaty.

36. Question. Is it the understanding of the Senator from Missouri from the testimony of official witnesses that the United States will withdraw from the treaty if Red China tests nuclear weapons in one of the three environments in which testing is banned by the treaty, although Red China will not be a party to the treaty?

Answer. I understood witnesses to say that whether the United States will withdraw from the treaty if and when Red China tests a nuclear device in the prohibited environments will depend upon a number of factors that cannot be determined at the present time. To me the important point would seem to be the fact that we have retained the right to withdraw, in this or any other case, if we think withdrawal advisable in our own national interests.

THE LATE CARL A. HATCH, OF NEW MEXICO

MR. CARLSON. Mr. President, former U.S. Senator Carl A. Hatch, of New Mexico, who passed away last week, was born in Kansas, and was one of the Senate's truly great statesmen.

I think it appropriate to mention the fact that he was the author of the Hatch Act, which Congress first passed in 1939, and a year later enlarged in scope. This legislation was timely, in that the Federal employees had been pressured to make contributions to political organizations. The situation became so bad that there was a general uprising against it. The late Senator Hatch wrote the legislation known as the Hatch Act, which was to prevent these abuses.

As we now approach another political campaign, there are rumors that the Federal employees may again be pressured to participate in raising funds for COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO. I hope this is only a rumor, for I think it would be most unfortunate if the Federal workers were again subjected to the pressures of political groups and organizations.

In the Wednesday, September 18, issue of the Topeka Daily Capital there was published an editorial entitled "Father of Hatch Act." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD, as a part of these remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FATHER OF HATCH ACT

The death of former U.S. Senator Carl A. Hatch, of New Mexico, recalls his vigorous efforts to bring about political reforms through the Hatch Act which Congress first

approved in 1939 and, a year later, enlarged the scope of the act.

Senator Hatch sought to restrict and control the political activities of members of the Federal civil service and at the same time protect them from intimidation or coercion in voting at elections.

The first Hatch legislation was designed primarily to prevent abuses such as had been reported by the Sheppard Senate committee in connection with the congressional campaign of 1938, when great numbers of people were on relief rolls.

Besides forbidding intimidation or coercion of Federal employees during election campaigns, the act prohibited solicitation or receipt of political contributions from relief workers or persons receiving Federal relief. Nor could relief funds be used to coerce voters, and it became unlawful for any person to promise any employment or other benefit as a reward for political activity.

The second Hatch Act, approved in 1940, extended the ban on partisan coercion, campaign assessments, and political activity to cover employees of State and local governments if engaged in full-time activities financed wholly or in part by Federal funds. This affected large blocs of highway department employees, for example, in the various States.

Drastic changes were also made in regulations governing campaign funds. Any political committee operating in more than one State was required to limit its expenditures to \$3 million in any calendar year. At the same time individual contributions for use in campaigns to nominate and elect Federal officers were restricted to \$5,000 each in any calendar year.

The first test of the law in the 1940 elections showed the law relating to contributions and expenditures to be full of loopholes, arising from vague phrasology which made it difficult to enforce. Committees acting independently of regular national committees collected and spent sums far in excess of the maximum allowed by the Hatch law. The 1944 presidential campaign provided additional evidence, historians note, of the ineffectiveness of the Hatch Act.

Perhaps the Hatch Act could be included in the same category or could be classed as an another noble experiment in Government but it did give some of the politicians pause and made them more circumspect in their operations.

If the Hatch Act has not been as effective as Senator Hatch hoped it would be, it in no wise dims the Senator's efforts to curb corruption and establish politics on a higher plane.

Aside from a notable career in the U.S. Senate, Senator Hatch was learned in the law and eventually became a Federal district judge in New Mexico. One of his colleagues on the Federal bench has described him as a "sound, upright man—constructive in every way."

He was also a kindly man, possessed of great good humor even after his eyesight began to fail and he retired from the Federal judiciary. Probably it was not well known in Kansas that the Senator from New Mexico, who fathered the Hatch Act, was a native Kansan, born at Kirwin in 1889. His career was a creditable one and he served the public well.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN ALABAMA

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, an editorial, entitled "They That Take the Sword," which was published this morning in the Washington Post, is a timely warning to the Negro leaders of America that in their legitimate fight for their constitutional rights, there is no place for violence or, as is pointed out in the editorial, for taking up the sword. The Post

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

International telecommunication convention and radio regulations, signed at Atlantic City October 2, 1947. (Superseded.) (TIAS 1901.)

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, signed at Washington October 11, 1947. (TIAS 2052.)

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. (TIAS 4044.)

Convention on safety of life at sea, signed at London June 10, 1948. (TIAS 2495.)

Protocol prolonging the international sugar agreement of May 6, 1937, signed at London August 31, 1948. (Expired together with the 1937 agreement.) (TIAS 1997.)

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the protocol signed on December 11, 1946, done at Paris November 19, 1948. (TIAS 2308.)

International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, dated at Washington February 8, 1949. (TIAS 2089.)

Protocol amending the agreement for the suppression of the circulation of obscene publications of May 4, 1910, with annex, signed at Lake Success, N.Y., May 4, 1949. (TIAS 2164.)

Telegraph Regulations (Paris revision 1949), signed at Paris August 5, 1949. (Superseded.) (TIAS 2175.)

Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS 3364.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this convention.)

Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS 3365.)

Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS 3362.)

Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at sea, dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS 3363.)

Protocol prolonging the international sugar agreement of May 6, 1937, signed at London August 31, 1949. (Expired together with the 1937 agreement.) (TIAS 2114.)

Convention on road traffic, with annexes, done at Geneva September 19, 1949. (TIAS 2487.)

Protocol modifying the convention of July 5, 1890, relating to the creation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, done at Brussels December 18, 1949. (TIAS 3922.)

Protocols prolonging the international sugar agreement of May 6, 1937, signed at London August 31, 1950, August 31, 1951, and August 30, 1952. (All three of these protocols expired together with the 1937 agreement.) (TIAS 2525, 2526, and 2862.)

International telecommunication convention, signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. (Superseded.) (TIAS 3266.)

International sugar agreement of 1953, done at London October 1, 1953. (Expired December 31, 1958.) (TIAS 3177.)

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles, done at New York June 4, 1954. (TIAS 3943.)

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring, done at New York June 4, 1954. (TIAS 3879.)

State treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria, signed at Vienna May 15, 1955. (TIAS 3298.)

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Washington June 25, 1956. (TIAS 4170.)

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done at New York October 26, 1956. (TIAS 3873.)

Protocol to the international convention for the regulation of whaling of December 2, 1946, done at Washington November 19, 1956. (TIAS 4228.)

Protocol amending the international sugar agreement of 1953, done at London December 1, 1956. (Expired December 31, 1958.) (TIAS 3937.)

Interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals, signed at Washington February 9, 1957. (TIAS 3948.)

Modifications of the first paragraph of Annex II of the international load line convention of July 5, 1930, communicated on October 27, 1947 (entered into force for United States July 13, 1957). (TIAS 4266.)

Convention on the high seas, done at Geneva April 29, 1958. (TIAS 5200.)

Telegraph Regulations (Geneva Revision 1958), signed at Geneva November 29, 1958. (TIAS 4390.)

International sugar agreement of 1958, done at London December 1, 1958. (TIAS 4389.)

Modifications of the fifth paragraph of annex II of the International Loadline Convention of July 5, 1930, communicated on September 19, 1949 (entered into force for United States Aug. 7, 1959). (TIAS 4550.)

The Antarctic treaty, signed at Washington December 1, 1959. (TIAS 4780.)

International Telecommunication Convention, signed at Geneva, December 21, 1959. (TIAS 4892.)

International wheat agreement, 1962, opened for signature at Washington, April 19-May 15, 1962. (TIAS 5115.)

2. International Agreements Other Than Treaties

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Stockholm, August 28, 1924. (Superseded.) (TS 708-A; 49 Statutes at Large 2741.)

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at London, June 18, 1929. (Superseded.) (46 Statutes at Large 2523.)

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Cairo, March 20, 1934. (Superseded.) (49 Statutes at Large 2741.)

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Buenos Aires, May 23, 1939. (Superseded.) (54 Statutes at Large 2049.)

Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 (Declaration of principles, known as the Atlantic Charter, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom), as reaffirmed in the Declaration by United Nations (see below) to which the U.S.S.R. adhered. (EAS 238.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated the principles affirmed in this charter.)

Declaration by United Nations, signed at Washington January 1, 1942. (EAS 236.) (Comment: See above; it is considered that the principles of the Atlantic Charter as reaffirmed by this declaration have been violated by the Soviet Union.)

Moscow agreements of November 1, 1943 (declarations of joint policies, United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Conference of Foreign Ministers). (Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1943, pp. 307-311.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated understandings relating to Germans charged with certain crimes.)

Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, to which the U.S.S.R. adhered August 9, 1945, pursuant to the Potsdam Protocol (see below):

Statement of joint understandings on future military operations against Japan; statement of purpose that "Korea shall become free and independent."

Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1943, pp. 412-413. (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated understandings set forth in this declaration.)

Teheran Declaration of December 1, 1943

(declaration on cooperation in war and peace, United States/United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R., with declaration regarding Iran. (Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1943, pp. 409-410.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated understandings set forth in this declaration.)

Protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin, signed at London September 12, 1944, United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and France. (Also amendments signed Nov. 14, 1944 and July 26, 1945.) (TIAS 3071.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated understandings set forth in this protocol.)

Armistice agreement with Rumania, signed at Moscow September 12, 1944. (EAS 490.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Armistice agreement with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow October 28, 1944. (EAS 437.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Agreement on control machinery in Germany, signed at London November 14, 1944, United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and France. (Also amendment signed May 1, 1945.) (TIAS 3070.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Armistice agreement with Hungary, signed at Moscow January 20, 1945. (EAS 456.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Yalta agreements (protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference), signed at Yalta February 11, 1945. (Department of State press release 239, March 24, 1947; "Foreign Relations," Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 975 ff.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated understandings set forth in the Yalta protocol.)

Act of military surrender (terms between the United States and other Allied Powers and Germany), signed at Rheims May 7, 1945, and at Berlin May 8, 1945. (EAS 502.)

Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., and the Provisional Government of the French Republic; declaration made and released at Berlin June 5, 1945. (Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, pp. 1051-1055.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this Declaration.)

Potsdam agreements (protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R., and proclamation defining terms for Japanese surrender, United States and United Kingdom, with later U.S.S.R. concurrence); protocol concluded August 2, 1945; proclamation signed July 26, 1945. (Department of State press release 238, March 24, 1947 (protocol); Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1945, pp. 137-138 (proclamation); Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. II, p. 1478 ff.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated these agreements.)

Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, signed at London August 8, 1945. (EAS 472.)

Four-Power agreement on certain additional requirements to be imposed on Germany, done at Berlin September 20, 1945. (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1945, pp. --.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), concluded at London November 16, 1945. (TIAS 1580.)

16908

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

Moscow agreements of December 27, 1945 (report of the Foreign Ministers meeting, United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.), signed at Moscow December 27, 1945. (Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 30, 1945, pp. 1027-1032.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated these agreements.)

Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. (TIAS 1808.)

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization, dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. (TIAS 1868.)

Moscow agreements of April 23, 1947 (report of Council of Foreign Ministers regarding German prisoners of war), done at Moscow April 23, 1947. (See Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1949, p. 824.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated these agreements.)

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Paris July 5, 1947. (Superseded.) (TIAS 1850.)

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea, approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, April 23-June 10, 1948. (TIAS 2899.)

World Health Organization Regulations No. 1 regarding nomenclature (including the compilation and publication of statistics) with respect to diseases and causes of death, adopted at Geneva July 24, 1948. (TIAS 3482.) (Also amendments to these regulations adopted June 30, 1949, TIAS 3482, and May 21, 1956, TIAS 4409.)

Quadripartite (Berlin Blockade) agreement of May 4, 1949 (agreement relating to the lifting of restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 on communications, transportation, and trade with Berlin), dated at New York May 4, 1949. (TIAS 1915.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated this agreement.)

Council of Foreign Ministers communiqué regarding communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and Western Zones of Germany and between Eastern and Western Zones, made and released at Paris, June 20, 1949. (Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1949, pp. 857-858.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated the understandings set forth in this communiqué.)

International sanitary regulations (WHO regulations No. 2), adopted at Geneva, May 25, 1951. (TIAS 3625.)

Universal Postal Union Convention, signed at Brussels, July 11, 1952. (Superseded.) (TIAS 2800.)

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization, dated at Geneva, July 25, 1953. (TIAS 3500.)

Resolutions by the General Conference of the UNESCO amending the constitution of the Organization, adopted at Montevideo, November 22 and December 8, 1954. (TIAS 3469.)

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations with respect to yellow fever, adopted at Mexico, May 26, 1955. (TIAS 5156.)

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations with respect to the form of international certificate of vaccination or revaccination against smallpox, adopted at Geneva, May 23, 1956. (TIAS 4420.)

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations with respect to the sanitary control of pilgrim traffic, adopted at Geneva, May 23, 1956. (TIAS 4823.)

Resolution by the General Conference of the UNESCO amending the constitution of the organization, adopted at New York November 10, 1956. (TIAS 3889.)

Universal Postal Union Convention (with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail, with final protocol), signed at Ottawa October 3, 1957. (TIAS 4202.)

Resolutions by the General Conference of the UNESCO amending the constitution of the organization, adopted at the 2d-7th and 10th (1959) sessions. (TIAS 4230.)

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the World Health Organization constitution, adopted at Geneva May 28, 1959. (TIAS 4643.)

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations with respect to the health part of the aircraft general declaration, adopted at Geneva May 19, 1960. (TIAS 4896.)

Declaration of understanding regarding the international convention of February 8, 1949 for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, opened for signature at Washington April 24, 1951. (TIAS 5380.)

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty, adopted at Canberra July 24, 1961. (TIAS 5094.)

Declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos, signed at Geneva July 23, 1962. (TIAS.)

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty, adopted at Buenos Aires July 23, 1962. (TIAS.)

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in accordance with the suggestion advanced by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules yesterday, I suggest to the Chair that the attachés of the Senate, except those who are authorized to be present in the Chamber, be excused.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The attachés of the Senate, except those whose duties require them to be present at this moment, are requested to retire from the Chamber. The Sergeant-at-Arms will please see that the attachés of the Senate, except those required to be present, retire from the Chamber. Senators will take their seats. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I believe that all Senators are present or accounted for.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the hour of 10:30 having arrived, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBCOFF in the Chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, the vote on ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty is one of the most difficult votes that I have ever cast as a U.S. Senator—or even in my 23 years in Congress. The difficulty is not with respect to my single vote having any effect on the outcome of the final vote by the Senate. That outcome was a foregone conclusion from the very start—overwhelmingly for ratification.

During the debate I have raised several questions. I had hoped that the answers to these questions could be definite and clear—at least enough for the resolution of any doubts that I had about the treaty. But they have not been. Admittedly, the answers have been speculative.

This issue is not only dominated by speculation. It is dominated by emotions. Those who support the treaty have been called pro-Communists. They have been charged by some extremists with treason and with selling out to Khrushchev. How ridiculous can one get with these charges? The charges are so ridiculous that no sensible person would take them seriously.

They remind me of those tragic days in the early fifties when articulate courage was almost eliminated by the techniques of "guilt by association" and "trial by accusation." The extremists of the right did our country a great disservice by those unsubstantiated charges. The damage was irreparable. What it did to our scientists and the way that it shackled our free scientific effort was revealed in the later fifties when Russia's sputnik revealed how tragically we were lagging behind Russia in science and technology.

I know—because I was a target of the extremists of the right. They called me "pro-Communist" and a "fellow traveler" because of my declaration of conscience.

But many, many of those who, back in the early fifties, decried the "guilt by association" and "trial by accusation" tactics of the extreme right are today guilty of the same abuses and excesses on the extreme left of the ideological spectrum.

For too many of the extreme left now charge those who oppose the treaty of being "murderers" and of deliberately poisoning the milk for children with lethal doses of strontium 90. At the outset of this debate, the press quoted one Senator as saying that any Senator who voted against ratification of the treaty should have his head examined.

Have we lost all sense of reasonableness? Cannot Members of the U.S. Senate have honest differences of opinions without being charged with mental deficiency or treason or crassly poisoning milk and killing babies or being "pro-Communist" by those who so emotionally disagree with them—both on the extreme right and on the extreme left?

What does the majority of the American people want? Ratification or rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty? The

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16909

Gallup poll and the Harris poll report that an overwhelming majority of the American people want the treaty to be ratified.

But that is not what my mail shows—and it is the heaviest mail that I have ever received in all of my entire service in Congress. More than that, it is not just organized pressure mail. Instead, it is individual mail in personal handwriting—not just printed or mimeographed mail—or printed cards distributed in great volume for persons just to automatically sign without thinking.

This mail is individually composed. It is highly emotional and often inflammatory—but equally so on both sides, whether for or against the treaty. Nevertheless it is clear that the people are expressing themselves with deep feeling—not just merely echoing what someone has told them to write. And the mail is from every section of the Nation.

Were I to be guided by what the mail indicates is the wish of the majority of Americans, I would have to vote against the treaty. For by better than an 8-to-1 margin the senders of letters and telegrams and postal cards to me have registered vigorous opposition to the treaty.

Yet, the pattern varies when just the Maine mail is taken—for the Maine mail has favored the treaty by a 2-to-1 vote. But even with Maine the expression of feeling has changed. Prior to Labor Day and during the summer season, the Maine mail was better than 3 to 1 in favor of the treaty. But after Labor Day the Maine mail has turned in the other direction with a majority registering opposition to the treaty. It would be difficult to conclude with any certainty what a majority of year-round Maine residents feel—since obviously a great deal of the Maine mail prior to Labor Day came from out-of-State summer visitors.

The totals of my mail run heavily in contradiction to the reports of the Gallup poll and the Harris poll. The only reconciliation that I can conclude is that if the Gallup poll and the Harris poll accurately reflect the position of a majority of Americans, then those who support the treaty apparently are not sufficiently enthusiastic for it and will not take the time or effort to write—or those who are against the treaty have such a high degree of intensity in the opposition to the treaty that they will take the time to write and express themselves.

One thing is quite clear. Regardless of whether the majority is for or against the treaty, the degree of articulated intensity of those against the treaty is much greater than those who are for the treaty.

Another thing is clear—that the polls and the mail—and the seasonal factor in the Maine mail on this issue—are too contradictory for me to let the mail have any significant influence on my final decision.

In trying to arrive at a conscientious decision, I have considered what would happen if the Senate did reject the treaty. First, it is clear that Khrushchev would spew vitriolic propaganda charging that the United States had thus proved that it did not want peace and

that we were "warmongers," intent on poisoning the air with strontium 90. Even though he is guilty himself of having broken the last test ban agreement with the multi-megaton open-air test nuclear explosions that Russia set off, his false propaganda would be believed by some and we would lose significant ground in the psychological war.

But Senate rejection of the treaty would not be the act that started the United States to resume open air nuclear testing. It would not for the very simple reason that President Kennedy has taken the position that the United States would refrain from open air testing as long as Russia refrained from open air testing.

Now let us face reality and the truth on this point. The Senate vote on the test ban treaty will neither stop open air testing if the treaty is ratified—nor start it if the treaty is rejected. It will not stop open air testing because it has already been stopped by President Kennedy in agreement with Khrushchev's keeping Russia from open air tests. By the same token, Senate rejection of the treaty will not start open air testing again.

I think Khrushchev feels that it is to the military advantage of Russia to keep us from resuming open air tests in the belief that Russia is significantly ahead of us in the high-yield weapons and will stay ahead as long as we do not make open air tests that are necessary if we are to close the high-yield weapons gap that so heavily favors Russia.

And he does not need a treaty to do this. All he needs to do is to refrain from conducting such open air tests. He knows that by the simple expedient of restraint, he will stop the United States from open air testing because of the expressions made by President Kennedy. Consequently, I believe it would be most unlikely that Khrushchev would order resumption of open air testing if the Senate were to reject this treaty.

Perhaps my conclusion in this regard can be criticized as being "speculative." But it is no more speculative than the answers given to the questions that I have raised in this debate—answers that even those providing the answers have admitted were "speculative." I believe that my conclusion in this regard is far less speculative.

So that in the final analysis, my decision must rest on whether the political and psychological disadvantages stemming from rejection of the treaty would be greater than the obvious national security disadvantages stemming from ratification of the treaty. Fortunately, the political and psychological disadvantages of treaty rejection have been very ably and fully presented out in the open to the public. And make no mistake about it, they are tremendously impressive arguments—almost compelling arguments.

Unfortunately, the national security disadvantages stemming from ratification of the treaty have not been as fully presented out in the open to the public. They have not because of the secrecy that has been invoked on key aspects that indicate the grave threat that the treaty can create to our national security. The public cannot be told.

But it can be told enough of the implications—implications so grave that even the enthusiastic proponents of the treaty unreservedly admit that the treaty is a calculated risk.

In the questions that I have asked in this debate, I have tried very hard to find a basis for which I could conscientiously vote for ratification of the treaty. I regret to say that the answers have not supplied such a basis.

On the other hand, it has been argued with sincerity and conviction that one could not conscientiously vote against the treaty because such a vote would be a vote against peace—or at least a first step toward peace. I cannot challenge that argument with complete certainty in my own mind. But in equal degree, I cannot challenge with complete certainty the argument made that the treaty may be a first step toward the undermining of our national security.

There have been several speeches expressing the gravest of misgivings about the treaty—only to be concluded with the announcement by the speakers that they would vote for the treaty.

I conclude my statement by saying that I have very grave misgivings about the harmful effects of rejection of the treaty—but by stating that in my opinion the jeopardy that the treaty imposes on our national security is a more compelling argument against the treaty than the political and psychological disadvantages that would stem from rejection of the treaty.

That is why I shall cast a very troubled vote against the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amended resolution of ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY (when Mr. ENGLE's name was called). Mr. President, the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is ill and necessarily absent. I have been asked to announce that if he were present and voting, he would vote "yea."

The rollcall was concluded.

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 80, nays 19, as follows:

[No. 168 Ex.] YEAS—80		
Aiken	Fong	McGee
Allott	Fulbright	McGovern
Anderson	Gore	McIntyre
Bartlett	Gruening	McNamara
Bayh	Hart	Metcalf
Beall	Hartke	Miller
Bible	Hayden	Monroney
Boggs	Hickenlooper	Morse
Brewster	Hill	Morton
Burdick	Holland	Moss
Cannon	Hruska	Mundt
Carlson	Humphrey	Muskie
Case	Inouye	Nelson
Church	Jackson	Neuberger
Clark	Javits	Pastore
Cooper	Johnston	Pearson
Cotton	Jordan, N.C.	Pell
Dirksen	Keating	Prouty
Dodd	Kennedy	Proxmire
Dominick	Kuchel	Randolph
Douglas	Long, Mo.	Ribicoff
Edmondson	Magnuson	Saltonstall
Ellender	Mansfield	Scott
Ervin	McCarthy	Smathers

16910

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

Sparkman	Williams, N.J.	Young, N.Dak.
Symington	Williams, Del.	Young, Ohio
Walters	Yarborough	

NAYS—19

Bennett	Lausche	Smith
Byrd, Va.	Long, La.	Stennis
Byrd, W. Va.	McClellan	Talmadge
Curtis	Mechem	Thurmond
Eastland	Robertson	Tower
Goldwater	Russell	
Jordan, Idaho	Simpson	

NOT VOTING—1

Engle

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification, as amended, is agreed to.

MR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution of ratification, as amended, was agreed to.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the President be immediately notified of the action of the Senate.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

MR. PROUTY subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier in the day I voted to ratify the nuclear test ban treaty.

It was at once the most momentous and difficult decision I have had to make since I first came to Congress 13 years ago.

A million thoughts go through a man's mind when he must help decide an issue that may affect the lives of millions of people not yet born.

I thought of the Soviet Union—its record of broken promises—its alternating promises of peace and threats of war.

I thought of a whole generation of Americans that have never known peace—complete and total peace—and I wonder whether they ever will.

I thought of the security of this country and of the risks we must take as a free people—whether the treaty be a shaft of light or merely a mirage.

All of these things were in my thoughts as I took the only course of action my conscience would allow me to take.

The treaty does not mean the end of the cold war that has haunted us night and day for 18 years. Perhaps it is not even the beginning of the end.

Yet to reject the treaty and to look back one day and find that this was the one chance for the beginning—a chance that would never appear again—that would be the greatest tragedy of all.

As a nation and as a people, our hopes for peace should never be higher than our ability to defend the freedom and safety of man.

We love liberty and would rather die than lose it and no treaty in the world will alter that resolve.

Mr. President, on Friday, September 20, the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] recalled for us the first anniversary of the passage by the Senate of Senate Joint Resolution 230, the so-called Cuban resolution. In his remarks, he recalled that that resolution

had been passed with one dissenting voice in the Senate.

That one dissenting vote was mine.

I found fault with that resolution primarily because it did not go to the seriousness of the Cuban situation as it then existed.

I thought then, as I think now, that we must establish a firm policy with respect to the Communist position in the Western Hemisphere as in all areas of the world. Had we established such a policy of will and of resolution, there would not be thousands of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba today—and perhaps missiles as well.

Now, as a year ago, an ad hoc foreign policy, treating Communist infiltration as localized "brush fires," accomplishes little to preserve the security necessary for the maintenance of the American way of life.

The Senator from New York also placed in the RECORD several newspaper articles relating to increased violence and tension in various Latin American countries. A reading of those articles indicates their connection in each instance with Castro's Cuba. There is some doubt that actual arms deliveries can be traced to Cuba, but the inspiration and doubtless much of the action is a Cuban import.

It seems to me now, as it did on September 20, 1962, that our concern should be as much with the nonmilitary activities in this hemisphere from Cuba as with military threats which could emanate from that island. I voted against the Cuban resolution last year. I think that vote was justified. I think, also, that the justification for that vote has been made even more secure with the passage of this last year and the events which have occurred in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. President, I earnestly hope that time will prove that my vote to ratify the test ban treaty will be as meaningful as I think my vote was against the Cuban resolution a year ago.

PHOTOGRAPHERS IN THE GALLERY

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. I assume I am correct that the official photograph, authorized by the adoption of the resolution yesterday, has been taken. If so, will the Sergeant at Arms be instructed to notify the photographers to clear their cameras out of the gallery?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The pictures have been taken. However, whether they have or not, I second the suggestion of the Senator from Oregon that the gallery be cleared of photographers as soon as possible.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sergeant at Arms will proceed to act accordingly.

POSTMASTER GENERAL

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senate is still in executive session. I ask that the nominations on the Executive Calendar be stated.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Walter E. Craig, of Arizona, to be U.S. district judge for the district of Arizona.

By Mr. DIRKSEN, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Abraham L. Marovitz, of Illinois, to be U.S. district judge for the northern district of Illinois.

By Mr. KEATING, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Thomas James Donegan, of New York, to be a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board; and

Edward D. Re, of New York, to be a member of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. If there be no further reports of committees, the clerk will state the nomination on the Executive Calendar. The nomination will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John A. Gronouski to be Postmaster General.

MR. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, I shall be very brief. I support the nomination of John A. Gronouski, of Wisconsin, to be Postmaster General of the United States. The nomination was reported unanimously by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Mr. Gronouski has a distinguished record as a professor, as an economist, and as an excellent administrator of the tax department of the State of Wisconsin. Mr. Gronouski is an unusually intelligent man, and very hard working. He has demonstrated ingenuity as administrator of the tax department. He has been extraordinarily fair in a position in which his fairness was severely tested.

One of the questions asked of Mr. Gronouski at the hearing yesterday was whether in his job he would be primarily a Democrat or an administrator. Mr. Gronouski answered quite frankly that in his view his job is one of administration, and that he would administer his job in a nonpartisan fashion. It should be recognized that as a Cabinet officer, John Gronouski will be free to champion the President's cause and he will do so I am sure very ably indeed.

I have known John Gronouski for many years. He has an excellent reputation in Wisconsin. He will do a thorough, competent, and intelligent job as Postmaster General.

As a topflight economist he will be able to give the President invaluable advice as a member of the Cabinet. I enthusiastically support the nomination of John Gronouski to be Postmaster General.

MR. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I join the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin in supporting the nomination of John Gronouski. I had an opportunity, about a week ago Sunday, to have quite a long conversation with Mr. Gronouski, following the announcement that the President had selected him for the nomination to be Postmaster General.

I probably had a better chance to get his views than most of those who have

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16933

1. "It is the policy of the Park Service to eliminate all inholdings—our property will be condemned."

2. "We don't need a park here. Michigan already has thousands of acres of State forest and national forest and State-owned lands of all kinds which nobody is using. (At this point a highway map of Michigan is displayed showing large green areas designating public-owned land.) Why isn't this land developed for parks?"

3. "It will be too expensive. Estimates are that it will cost \$17 million."

4. "It's too far from the people."

5. "We already have a national park in Michigan and only 6,000 people visit that in a year."

6. The State of Michigan can do the job just as well without bringing the Federal Government into it."

7. "What about our schools and government units? If you take all this property off the tax rolls, how are we going to pay for our schools and services?"

8. "New construction in the area is almost at a standstill because of all the confusion about the park. You can't build a cottage on the lake because anything built after July 1, 1961, is subject to condemnation."

9. "People have the inalienable constitutional right to own property and to use it as they see fit."

All of these points have been answered in Senate hearings and elsewhere, but they are still being brought up whenever discussions of the bill occur. Taking them up in order:

1. It is true the policy of the Park Service is to eliminate all inholdings within the boundaries of the true national parks, but this would not be a national park. It would be a national lakeshore recreation area. And there is quite a difference in the two concepts. If only "lakeshore recreation area" had a shorter, or catcher, title, most of the confusion would die out.

Condemnation is severely limited in the Hart bill and is spelled out in detail.

To begin with, two separate areas are recognized within the boundaries. One of these is called the "inland lakeshore residential area." This is carefully plotted in the bill and includes about 2,500 acres (this could be increased to 3,500 by an advisory commission), primarily around Platte Lake, Little Platte Lake, Glen Lake, and Little Traverse Lake. This is the area in which most of the present development is concentrated.

The other area is simply called "lakeshore" and refers to the rest of the land within the boundaries of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National "Lakeshore."

Improved property within the "lakeshore" area, and any property within the "inland lakeshore residential area" is exempt from condemnation (and this is specifically stated in the bill) if it conforms to properly set up local zoning ordinances, or in the absence of such ordinances, if it conforms to the zoning standards set up in the bill. These zoning regulations are intended to protect the character of the lakeshore as it now is, and to prevent destruction of scenic values.

This private property which is exempted from condemnation can be deeded to one's heirs or sold to another party, subject only to the zoning laws. There is no time limit on this—it is in perpetuity.

Furthermore, in all cases of suspected violation of zoning, the burden of proof shall be on the Park Service. Even if violation is proved, the violator must be given 60 days to conform to zoning before condemnation can be instituted. If he conforms, the property cannot be condemned.

These safeguards against condemnation are much more strictly drawn and are more liberal than with any of the other seashore laws passed by Congress. In fact, the Park Service feels some of them are too liberal and would like more power left in the hands of the director of the Park Service.

However, it should be remembered that Congress determines the limits under which the Federal agencies act, and the Park Service would be bound by the act as it eventually passes Congress.

2. The thought of the thousands of acres already under State or Federal control in Michigan causes many people to wonder if taking another area is justified at all. But if these lands are examined, the question answers itself.

Most of the State-owned land in question (about 80 percent is acreage turned back to the State by individuals who could not or did not want to pay taxes on it. In other words, it was not worth keeping. Most of this tax-reverted land is marginal in worth and has little or no mass recreational value. Very little of this land, for instance, has water access.

Much of it is good for hunting, and some of it is used for timber production. It looks impressive on a State map, but only a large-scale map shows the true picture, for most of this land has extensive inholdings of privately owned acreage.

3. The cost of a project is of primary consideration, and when the figure \$17 million is raised, eyebrows go up with it.

But this figure is the total value of all the land within the boundaries of the proposed development. Obviously if you allow residences and commercial establishments (value of which is much greater than that of raw land) to remain, and buy only the unimproved land available within the area, the cost will be much less. It is estimated that the total appropriation for the purchase of these unimproved lands will not exceed \$5 million.

4. In order for a recreation area to be used, and thus be worthwhile, it must be close to those who will use it. For many years this was not true of Sleeping Bear. It was a long way from the centers of population.

But distances have become "shorter" in travel time in this modern age and there is every indication they will become shorter still. Twenty million people live within 300 miles (less than a day's drive) of the area, and this figure is increasing at a rapid pace. Already the new expressways hustle people northward at a clip undreamed of just a few years back.

5. Yes, Michigan does have a national park, Isle Royale, situated about 30 miles out into Lake Superior (a 5-hour ferry ride or an expensive air hop) is a true national park. It is primarily a wilderness area. There are no roads on the island, and it is primarily for those who can walk into the area and live off what they can carry on their backs, or boat around the edges. The season is short, and there are only two lodge hotels there. It is valuable for what it is—a wilderness area—but it is in no way comparable to the proposed development at Sleeping Bear.

6. Anyone who proposes to "let the State do it" just hasn't been reading the record.

Last year our State parks turned away an estimated 100,000 campers because there was not enough room for them.

Eleven States have bonding programs in excess of \$50 million for parks and park improvements. Michigan was able to wheedle the legislature into approving a \$5-million bond issue a couple of years ago, and there are hopes that another \$5 million may be forthcoming. But this cannot put the State where it should be in the parks program, since only \$1 million of this could be spent for land purchase.

State Representative Reimer VanTil, Republican, of Holland, chairman of the interim committee on State parks and public lands, estimated in a report issued in June of 1963 that Michigan needs a total of \$84,475,175 in park appropriations for the next 5 years.

Meanwhile the Province of Ontario in

Canada beckons to the entire Midwest in its quest for the tourist dollar.

Ontario has been able to provide many services in its provincial parks that Michigan admires and would like to emulate. Almost every park has a nature museum, two or three full-time naturalists who lead guided nature walks (Michigan has a total of three naturalists for the entire State), evening nature films and lectures, and well laid out and spacious campsites.

All of these attractions have made Canada a vacationer's paradise and drawn many potential tourists away from Michigan. Most of these desirable services are not now offered in any Michigan park, but would be at Sleeping Bear under the National Park Service.

7. Actually the problem of removal of taxable property and the lowering of the tax base would not be as serious as it might appear. Only unimproved property would be bought by the Park Service, and this has the lowest value for taxes. But it might do harm, especially to the school district, until property values take the expected upturn that the impetus of a Federal recreation area should provide.

A section of the Griffin bill, however, provides that the Federal Government make payments to the local subdivisions in lieu of taxes for property removed from the tax rolls until the bonded indebtedness contracted before the area was established is paid off. This provision gives needed protection to the school district and suggests one area of compromise between the Hart and Griffin bills.

Many of the services now provided by the townships and the counties, such as roads, fire protection, and public safety, would be the responsibility of the Park Service. And it is expected that disbursements for these services by local government would lessen.

8. It is true that new construction in the Sleeping Bear area has dropped off considerably of late. People are waiting to see what Congress will do and which bill, if any, will be passed.

This cutoff date of July 1, 1961, in the Hart bill refers only to construction of unimproved property outside of the inland lakeshore residential area. New construction would be allowed on the inland lakeshore area under the provisions of the Hart bill as it now stands, but there is apprehension in the Bear country that this provision might be changed in the final draft of the bill by the Senate committee.

This fear has caused many people who were about to start construction in the area to hold off until the whole matter is settled.

This cutoff date, harsh as it seems at the present time, was put into the bill for a purpose. Cape Cod had no such cutoff date, and this cost the taxpayers millions of dollars of additional money when land speculators platted subdivisions in the area between the time the bill was proposed and the final time of passing by Congress.

9. The "inalienable right of the people" argument has been bandied about in this country for a long time, and has caused more arguments per square word than any other phrase in history.

We like to think we are a people with almost unlimited freedom, but if we stop to ponder it, this is not the case. The more civilized we become, the more individual freedom we give up in order to exist in our complicated society. The good old days when every man's home was his castle, unimpregnable from without, has disappeared. We have accepted the constitutionality of condemnation of private property for the public good in such areas as highways and urban renewal.

We have also accepted the limitations on use of our property by zoning and the laws of our community. Thus, we cannot make a bordello or opium den of our property, or start a glue factory in a residential area.

16934

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

This is really all which is involved with the zoning principles set up in the Hart bill. Many people have commented about the clean appearance of the Sleeping Bear area and the total lack of honky-tonk commercialization in the area. The proposed zoning is directed toward keeping the area the way it is now.

[From the Ann Arbor (Mich.) News, Sept. 18, 1963]

SENATE UNIT HAS SAY ON DUNES
(By Doug Fulton)

Where does the Dunes project stand now? What is happening to the various bills? How soon will we know if we will have a Sleeping Bear National Lakeshore and, if we do, what sort of area will it be?

The answer to this lies at the present time in a Senate subcommittee. It is called the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

The chairman of the subcommittee is Senator ALAN BIBLE, Democrat, of Nevada. Members are Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Democrat, of New Mexico; Senator ERNEST GRIENING, Democrat, of Alaska; Senator FRANK E. MOSS, Democrat, of Utah; Senator LEE METCALF, Democrat, of Montana; Senator CARL HAYDEN, Democrat, of Arizona; Senator GORDON ALLOTT, Republican, of Colorado; Senator LEN B. JORDAN, Republican, of Idaho; and Senator MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Republican, of Wyoming.

This subcommittee has been holding hearings on the Sleeping Bear proposals ever since the introduction of Senator HART's first bill in 1961. The latest hearings took place in Washington, D.C., in March and April of this year. Later, the subcommittee toured the Sleeping Bear area and held a full day's hearing in Frankfort in July. The full report of these hearings is contained in a 435-page booklet issued by the committee.

From the testimony these men have heard, and the communications sent to them, they will recommend one of several courses of action: (1) that S. 792 (the Hart bill) be reported out to the floor of the Senate without change; (2) that the bill be reported out with certain changes recommended by the committee, or (3) that the bill be killed in committee.

The chances of passage on the floor of the Senate and a concurring vote in the House are good if debate can be scheduled. This might turn out to be quite a problem this year because of the anticipated filibuster of the civil rights bill and a flood of priority legislation already scheduled for debate.

Another roadblock to passage may lie in the reporting priority of bills by the subcommittee. It is understood the subcommittee is planning to report out the Cayon-lands Recreation area bill before the Sleeping Bear bill, and this may have an adverse effect from a budget standpoint.

There is always a danger in trying to guess in what final shape a bill will emerge from committee. These committees are subject to many pressures, both from within and without.

It is known that one of the Senators on the subcommittee is dead set against the Sleeping Bear bill.

Senator SIMPSON, of Wyoming (a former Governor of that State), was recently elected to the Senate and put on the Public Lands Committee. He is against Federal intervention of any kind and is a strong critic of the National Park Service. At many times in the hearings conducted on Sleeping Bear he voiced his prediction that "once the Park Service gets into the area, they'll take over. They will make—the Park Service will make—the most vexatious regulations in the area determined to procure the privately owned property. And eventually they will get it."

Senator SIMPSON stated in the hearings in Frankfort, "I hope the Congress will refuse

to pass this bill * * * In fact, I would be against the passage of the Griffin bill. You don't need either one of them."

And yet Senator SIMPSON gave his support on the floor of the Senate (and even allowed his name to appear as cosponsor) to a bill introduced by Senator METCALF to "provide for the establishment of the Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area" in Montana and Senator SIMPSON's own State of Wyoming. This was on August 15, more than a month after the hearings on Sleeping Bear.

On the other hand, Senator METCALF appears to be very much in favor of the Sleeping Bear bill. He stated in the hearings that "it would be better to have protection such as is provided in this bill (the Hart bill) for a large buffer zone rather than just take a strip of land along the lakeshore and then have all sorts of entertainment establishments such as are developing around our national parks—and I am not critical, but West Yellowstone is an example of what develops on the fringes of a park." West Yellowstone is in the Senator's own State of Montana.

The other members of the subcommittee have not committed themselves in any way publicly. From their line of questioning in the hearings one can tell that some of them are critical of certain portions of the Hart bill and that some changes probably will be made in the final draft.

It is extremely unlikely that the bill will be killed in committee. This same subcommittee has indicated its approval of the new Lakeshore and Seashore Area concept by reporting out the bills on Cape Cod, Point Reyes, and Padre Island.

What will undoubtedly come out to the floor of the Senate is some sort of compromise between the Hart and Griffin bills. One compromise almost certain to be made is Representative GRIFFIN's proposal of payment to school districts and local government units on lieu of taxes.

The question of size—whether 37,000 or 77,000 acres (or even larger)—is the most ticklish and will cause the most trouble in solving.

This problem, unfortunately has become tied up with politics. While the subcommittee was holding hearings in Washington, the Michigan Legislature, in what appears to be a straight-party vote, pushed through a resolution that "the proposed Federal recreation area * * * should be confined to that general area described in the National Park Service Report of 1959, 'Our Fourth Shore'." (This report, as pointed out earlier, was made from aerial photographs and called for a park of about 30,000 acres).

Many Republicans, however strongly support the larger area bill of Senator HART, and are openly critical of the manner in which the resolution supporting the smaller area was passed in the Michigan Legislature. They point out that the resolution was read by title only and that their is a good possibility many members of the legislature did not know the exact provisions of the resolution. It has been noted, furthermore, that the resolution passed late at night and was one of a number of laws and resolutions put through hurriedly during a marathon session.

The issue has also become clouded by the insistence of many people that it be regarded as a battle between liberal and conservative—between the "little man at the local level" and the "power of the mighty Federal bureaucracy." This undoubtedly will have an effect on the final form of the bill.

Most of the State and National conservations organizations have filed statements in support of the larger area bill.

These include the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the Michigan Parks Association, the Michigan Natural Areas Council, and the Michigan Audubon Society on the State level, and the National Wildlife Fed-

eration, the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the National Parks Association, all national organizations.

Most of these point out the national significance of the area.

Roland Clement, staff biologist of the National Audubon Society, stated in his report, "I know of nothing else like it in the Eastern United States or Canada. The bluffs are much higher than the famous Martha's Vineyard, Mass., bluffs that have been great tourist attractions for years."

Statements against the proposal have been largely filed by area residents and the Citizen's Council.

It will be up to the Public Lands Subcommittee to sift through the testimony, the statements, and all the other evidence they have been given and report out to the floor what, in their considered judgment, is a bill that will best serve the interests of Michigan and the United States.

One "compromise" was suggested by Dr. Ira Gabrielson, president of the Wildlife Management Institute and one of the outstanding conservation figures in the United States.

He suggested that the citizens of Michigan accept all the land proposed in both the Hart and Griffin proposals. "No matter how much you set aside," he said, "it won't be enough 25 years from now."

TJ
ANOTHER VIEW OF COMMUNISM

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, on this final day of test ban treaty debate—the day on which the United States becomes bound by this pact with communism—it seems appropriate that there be entered in the RECORD the views of a highly regarded expert on Communist affairs.

A current issue of U.S. News & World Report carries the text of a discussion with Zbigniew Brzezinski, head of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs. The brief interview is most illuminating in that this acknowledged authority on the Soviet bloc regards the test ban treaty as much less than a "fundamental change in our relations" with the Soviets.

He also casts a jaundiced eye on the so-called Sino-Soviet dispute and feels that in some respects we have "swallowed the Soviet line." Although I personally do not concur in all of the speaker's postulates regarding the so-called Cuban crisis last October, I am nevertheless impressed with his candor and his departure from the customary stereotyped views of the Communist menace.

I recommend this article to my colleagues' attention, and I ask that it be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WITH TEST BAN TREATY, HAS KHRUSHCHEV CHANGED HIS WAYS?—INTERVIEW WITH AN AUTHORITY ON COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

(NOTE.—Why did Khrushchev suddenly make a nuclear deal with the West? Is he on our side now?)

(In this exclusive interview, one of America's leading students of communism takes a close look at Russia's motives behind the test ban treaty. He also puts the Russia-China dispute in perspective, and tells what it means to the United States.

(Zbigniew Brzezinski is head of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University. His writings and lectures have made him a widely recognized authority on communism. He has been denounced by Moscow, most recently for an

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16935

article on Russia which the Reds called "brazenly impudent.")

Question. Dr. Brzezinski, with this new nuclear test ban treaty, do you think that Khrushchev now will be taking a softer line?

Answer. I am hopeful that the test ban agreement will somewhat stabilize the situation, and that the Soviets will commit themselves to a more pacific policy. But this doesn't happen overnight.

We ought to realize that the Soviet Union has a certain continuity of purpose, and certain long-range interests, and certain underlying assumptions which don't change from day to day. And they don't change suddenly as a result of the signature of any treaty.

Question. Does that mean they never change?

Answer. They change over a longer period of time, to be sure, just as everything changes in the world.

Yet we in this country keep going through these phases in which we talk first about the Soviets being revolutionary, then about "good old conservative Uncle Joe," then Uncle Joe becomes a tremendous menace in retrospect, Khrushchev was a good guy, then he was an adventurer in Cuba, now he's a good guy again.

I must say, to anyone who works professionally in this field it's pretty discouraging to see these wild swings of public and press opinion in this country.

Question. Do you mean that this treaty won't bring with it a basic change in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Answer. I think we ought to understand that the Soviet Union operates in long-range terms, that signing of the treaty involves a reassessment by the Soviets of the present world situation, and that this reassessment will have certain binding consequences for the next 3 or 4 years. But it does not represent a fundamental change in our relations.

I feel I ought to make it very clear that the Soviets think of the world as changing in terms of phases. There are revolutionary phases and there are quiescent phases.

Question. Are we now in a quiescent phase?

Answer. Yes, that's the Soviet assessment of the world scene, an assessment that imposes on them a certain broad strategy, that of peaceful coexistence.

Question. Why?

Answer. The crucial factor is the relative balance of power. If, in their judgment, that balance of power changes in their favor, that in itself would put us in a new phase, another revolutionary phase.

Changes come about like this: Khrushchev, I think, overestimated what he thought was a very effective—for him—balance of power last year. Ever since 1957, Khrushchev had felt that Soviet rockets, our overestimation of those rockets—the so-called missile gap—plus his effectiveness on the political-diplomatic front, would force us to yield.

In Cuba, he found that he had overextended himself, and he pulled back. Now, after that very painful reassessment, he's adopting this very different posture.

Question. Do you think the dispute with the Chinese was an important reason for the Russians' getting into this treaty?

Answer. No. I think that by far the most important reason was the confrontation in Cuba, which forced the Soviets to realize that their military power was inadequate to the tasks which Khrushchev has set before the Soviet Union.

But I should add that I think the Chinese business did play a minor part in Khrushchev's decision. I would argue that the conflict with the Chinese closed off an alternative course of action for Khrushchev. It kept him from choosing the policy of what is called the national-liberation struggle—that is stirring up revolutionary struggles

in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The reason he didn't do that is the row with the Chinese. The national-liberation struggle is what the Chinese emphasize, and to have adopted it would have been to subordinate himself to the Chinese.

Question. Do you mean that it would have meant accepting the Chinese version of the world?

Answer. That's right. And, for that strategy, the Chinese are a better model. In this sense, the Chinese problem enters into the test ban decision in a secondary way, but not as a factor of prime importance.

Question. Are the Chinese really more offensive-minded than the Soviets?

Answer. Both are really offensive and revolutionary-minded. At the present moment, the Soviets, because they've accepted the quiescent phase, are less revolutionary than the Chinese. But, on the other hand, only a year ago in Cuba, the Soviets proved themselves more adventurous than the Chinese. So I think that we should not accept unquestioningly the Soviet labeling of the Chinese as warmongers. I think the Chinese have been very cautious.

Question. In what way?

Answer. In their handling of the Quemoy-Matsu situation, and again in their attack on India. There, China showed a rather uniquely successful combination of military power subordinated to political ends and subject to very effective political control. And the Chinese were quite right in arguing that their way is far more sophisticated and less dangerous in the world sense than adventures of the sort the missiles in Cuba involved.

Question. Have we actually been swallowing a Soviet line about the Chinese being so bloodthirsty?

Answer. Yes, to an extent. The Soviets have been dishing that out and the Chinese have, in a sense, made it easier for them by adopting rather crude and bloodthirsty formulations in some of their public statements. And it's true that the U.S. public has, by and large, swallowed this Soviet line, which does not, in fact, correspond entirely to reality.

Question. Will Khrushchev use this quiescent phase to try to alter the military balance of power in his favor?

Answer. He may do several things all at the same time. He will probably hope that the knowledge gained in recent tests will improve the Soviet military posture. There's always the unknown factor of a technological breakthrough on either side. But, beyond that, since he does not seem to be undertaking a crash program of military development, he may hope that diplomatic and political opportunities will open up, particularly in Europe, which would create new advantages for the Soviet Union.

Question. What, specifically, does he want to accomplish?

Answer. I think the danger is that Khrushchev is trying to maneuver us into guaranteeing the division of Europe, into recognizing Soviet hegemony east of the Elbe. He wants to maneuver us into more or less overtly favoring this division, thereby alienating our Western European Allies.

IF THE WEST RELAXES

Question. Speaking of Western Europe, is there now likely to be a military letdown on the part of our allies?

Answer. I think if the Soviets could achieve a relative weakening of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) defense forces, or of the American commitment to the defense of Europe, particularly because of European-American tension, they would be happy. But, by and large, what bothers me so much about our attitude toward European problems is our failure to understand that the defense problem is no longer the primary problem.

Question. If it isn't defense, what is it?

Answer. There isn't any likelihood in the foreseeable future of the Soviet Union's launching an attack on Western Europe. The Soviets realize that such an attack would be tantamount to signing their own death warrant. Consequently, no one in Western Europe is preoccupied with that problem any more. But Europeans are preoccupied with their future political relationships with us and with the Russians. And here the United States, since the middle of the 1950's, has had nothing to offer.

Question. Is that what accounts for General de Gaulle's attitude in France?

Answer. I think De Gaulle is slowly and in a deceptive fashion—and you might remember he has said that deception is the art of leadership—moving in the direction of becoming the exponent of the new European policy. His very vague and misleading slogan of "Europe to the Urals" is not yet a policy, but at least it's a guideline indicating where Europe might head in the future. And he has suggested that America now is, in effect, a copartner with the Soviet Union in the division of Europe and that at some future point, Europe—under De Gaulle's leadership, of course—will have to move forward with proposals of its own.

Question. Do you think De Gaulle really believes he can bring Khrushchev into a European community—in effect, to change sides?

Answer. I think what De Gaulle has in mind is a very long-range historical process. In it, the Soviets, being repulsed by the Chinese, would have no choice but to become associated with Western Europe—they and the East Europeans, both.

Much would depend, of course, on the policy of the United States. If we would seem to be joining the Russians in defending the partition of Europe, that would create opportunities for the Russians to exploit Western European frustration with us.

Question. In this quiescent phase, it is necessary for the United States to maintain its military superiority over the Soviets?

Answer. Yes. I think it follows that, in the nuclear age, the defensive power on the world scene has to be stronger than the offensive one simply because the defender has to be able to absorb the first blow, and then respond.

In the past, in terms of military strategy, the defender could be weaker, because the cost of an offensive in casualties tended to be higher for the attacker than for the defender.

Question. There's no question that the Soviets remain in an offensive role—

Answer. If we look at some of the recent confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as Berlin, Cuba, and, indirectly, Laos, none of them was a matter of the expansion of our sphere of influence. It's the other way around. And, after all, it was less than a year ago that the Soviets forced us to the brink of war, "eyeball to eyeball."

Question. Would you expect that Khrushchev would now shy away from foreign adventures of the Cuba type?

Answer. Yes, I would be inclined to think that the Soviets will avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. But this does not mean that, if a favorable revolutionary situation arises—be it in British Guiana, elsewhere in Latin America, Africa—that the Soviets would not exploit it. They would—and they are exploiting such situations right now.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ERRORS

Question. Do you believe it's true that Khrushchev is the best Soviet leader from our standpoint, that we should go along with him because any successor is sure to be worse?

Answer. I think there are some things we should be grateful to Khrushchev for. We ought to be grateful for his mishandling

16936

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 24

of his relationship with the Chinese. We should be grateful to him for very effectively weakening Soviet control over Eastern Europe. We should be grateful for his introducing disarray into international communism by a lot of quite bumptious and sudden initiatives.

More seriously, though, I think it's very dangerous to conduct a foreign policy on the assumption that you have to help your opponent, especially since we know very little about internal politics among the Kremlin leaders. If there were open debate there, it might be different.

Also, I have never personally subscribed to the idea that, in recent years, there was a Stalinist alternative to Khrushchev. By and large, his policies have been endorsed by the party apparatus, and are favored by those most likely to succeed him.

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION HELPS ALASKA TOURISM

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, the Small Business Administration performs an important service. Many farms and communities across the country have benefited from its loans and studies.

As an example of the SBA at its best, Senators will be interested in an article entitled "How SBA Helps Vacation-Travel Business," published in the periodical the Travel Agent. In the article, Harold Brown, Special Assistant for Area Redevelopment, SBA, refers to most helpful studies the Administration has financed on the development of Alaska's great, unused vacation resources. Here is an example of how SBA has been helpful to the communities and business of my State and of how bureaucratic delay and redtape were not allowed to reduce the effectiveness of the vital SBA program.

I commend Mr. Brown for his article. I urge SBA to work with equal efficiency and skill in all its areas of endeavor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**How SBA HELPS VACATION-TRAVEL BUSINESS:
ADMINISTRATION IMPROVES SERVICES TO
AGENCIES AND FACILITIES FOR CLIENTS BY
TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**
(By Harold D. Brown, Special Assistant for
Area Redevelopment, Small Business Adminis-tration)

Every now and then a travel agent asks us at the Small Business Administration, "How can you help the vacation-travel business when so much of it is big business?" My answer is that SBA helps a great deal because lots of the business, including travel agencies, is small.

The efficient travel agent strives to arrange for vacation clients comfortable journeys with pleasant scenery, appetizing meals and restful sleep en route to destinations that provide refreshing recreation. Such services, when obtained at prices within the clients' budgets, bring repeat or reference business. By research, technical and financial assistance, SBA helps improve and expand both the services of travel agencies and the facilities their vacation clients use.

Since most travel agencies subsist on commissions from airlines, railroads, steamship lines and hotel and motel chains, which are big business, many assume that the SBA has no concern with their clients' comfort. More than once, I have heard a travel agent say, "But surely you can't help improve railroad

travel!" Actually, SBA has arranged redevelopment loans for two small railroads, one in an area of a vanishing industry, another in a Great Lakes region of unspoiled natural beauty. While this help may not have improved railroad service greatly, it did provide travel agents having rail-fan clients with two more vacation attractions to which these clients can be referred.

As the older vacation resorts grow more crowded and more expensive, demand rises for the moderate-priced, off-trail vacation with a hobby interest. But as population grows, such retreats become scarcer. This poses for the travel agent a problem whose dimensions the Recreation Resources Review Commission has explored.

In a report to President Kennedy last year, the RRRC estimated that the 4.4 billion occasions on which Americans took part in outdoor activity in 1960 will, by 1975, have swelled to 6.9 billion. There remain spaces vast enough to accommodate the vacation throngs, Alaska, for example. One-fifth the size of all other States combined, with magnificent mountains, awe-inspiring rivers and forests and a fascinating Eskimo culture, the newest State, as a territory, was a place to which travel agents frequently referred discriminating clients.

But the cold war made Alaska a military bastion and statehood has intensified its economic problems. The vacation resources remain but the travel facilities are geared to the tastes of free-spending expense account executives, military personnel and highly paid seasonal workmen, "captive visitors," not vacationers.

Only after SBA awarded the University of Alaska a \$40,000 grant to research the State's unused vacation resources did operators of travel facilities become fully aware of a neglected opportunity. Now, slowly, with SBA financial help, facilities are being reoriented in a way that may make Alaska one of the greatest vacation States within a generation.

At Juneau, the capital, the Franklin Hotel has applied an \$85,000 SBA business loan to an expansion and improvement; at Valdez, the Beals Hotel employed a \$20,000 SBA loan for the same end. SBA makes these long-term, low-interest loans available for modernizing, converting and expanding small travel facilities, the research showing places of need.

SPORTS AND BRACING CLIMATE

Juneau, situated in one of the State's most beautiful settings, offers the vacationer fresh-and salt-water fishing in a climate no less bracing in winter than summer. Valdez, at the head of a fjordlike arm of Prince William Sound, offers similar sports and the Western Hemisphere's most northerly ice-free port.

The SBA-supported research concluded that if Alaska is to gain the higher business income, tax revenues and employment locked up in its unused recreational resources, its travel facilities must provide not alone for the "captive visitors" but for more modest vacation budgets.

As travel agents know, competition is the surest means of bringing down prices. Loans of the type SBA approved for the Juneau and Valdez hotels help bring this about.

Some travel agents may also long for new careers but in SBA's experience the dedicated ones are content to serve travelers. To plan a memorable recreational vacation for a client, then inspire the client to take it also requires creativity. But the growth of vacation travel, the spread of installment sales, the need for competitive advertising and the need for more working capital, generate problems. Available at SBA's 61 field offices are SBA-published aids which many travel agents have found helpful on these. Titles include: "Are You Selling Enough Service?"; "Can You Afford Installment Selling?"; "Improving Your Collections from

Credit Sales"; "Using Weather Services in Your Business"; "Direct-Mail Advertising for Small Retailers"; "Advertising for Prestige and Profit"; "Gift and Art Shops"; "Bookstore Operations"; "Are You Making the Most of Your Store Windows?" and, most important: "Creative Thinking: A Common Sense Approach."

And for agents with gross yearly receipts not exceeding \$1 million who need funds to modernize or expand, or for working capital, there are available loans for a maximum of 10 years at 5½ percent yearly interest, (4 percent in the more than 900 redevelopment areas). A number of agents have availed themselves of this help in solving problems of growth.

A married couple operating an agency and greeting card business in a Kansas City suburb opened two branches. A spurt of net sales from \$325,000 in 1958 to \$428,000 in 1960 left them short of working capital to finance installment collections. A 5-year, \$15,000 SBA loan, of which their bank took 25 percent, eased their difficulty. The couple pledged store fixtures and supplies as loan collateral. The business continues to expand.

Another, larger, Detroit agency operated by two brothers had net sales close to \$1 million and 1962 net profits of \$35,000. But airline requirements of semimonthly remittances left them also short of working capital. Their bank loaned them \$85,000 for 5 years, SBA agreeing to advance 70 percent of the loan balance whenever the bank requested; they pledged accounts receivable and property as collateral. Their sales have increased.

SBA does not act alone in financing facilities. Banks participate in about two-thirds of the SBA loans and the agency also lends funds to State and local development companies for their use in helping finance travel facilities. Also, SBA makes loans for these purposes in concert with other Federal agencies. The help is not limited to hotels and motels.

SEA HELPS TRAVEL

Ski lifts at Grand Rapids in the Sawtooth Mountains of northern Minnesota and at Sand Point in the Idaho Rockies are among recreational facilities recently built with this assistance. A unique vacation monument to the assistance is a redeveloped 25-mile steam railroad in Michigan's upper peninsula, skirting Lake Superior's wooded southern shore.

A \$150,000 SBA loan to a local development company made possible the Minnesota ski facility and on the \$150,000 financing of the Idaho ski installation, SBA was joined by the Rural Electrification Administration; a bank took a 25 percent share of each loan. The Area Redevelopment Administration largely financed the railroad's redevelopment, SBA investigating the project's feasibility and negotiating bank and other participations in the ARA loan.

On most of its own loans SBA charges interest of 5½ percent yearly, but this is reduced to 4 percent in redevelopment areas. Since all of the foregoing projects are in redevelopment areas, SBA's share in the ski lifts earns the lower, 4 percent, which was also ARA's rate on the railroad loan. REA charges only a 2-percent rate but banks participating in these as in all such loans charged their regular rate.

Citing the low Federal rates, some critics call such financing "spending for the sake of spending," a charge that overlooks the fact that the loans are well secured, must be repaid, and that the financed projects benefit underdeveloped areas much in need of commerce and industry.

AGENTS HELP BUILD AREA'S STRENGTH

Travel agents may not realize it but every time they route a client to a vacation redevelopment area, they help build the area's

Appendix

DCL

Dirksen Shows Statesmanship on Test Ban

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, September 24, 1963

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the victory today on the test ban treaty had many authors. President Kennedy has eloquently brought the essential facts home to the American public. Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary Harriman have kept close watch over the treaty ever since our purpose was first announced. Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD and Senate Whip HUMPHREY worked tirelessly with their colleagues to head off any threats and to keep the issues clear. The people of this Nation, too, helped make today's vote possible by recognizing the treaty for what it is—a limited but essential breakthrough to potentially greater future achievements.

One of the men who helped the Nation to recognize the stakes involved in the treaty was Senate Minority Leader DIRKSEN. We who serve with him were once again grateful that great issues inspire magnificent responses when they are most needed.

Much has already been said about the great work Senator DIRKSEN has done on this treaty, and I was very much impressed with a comment made in an editorial that appeared in the Camden, N.J., Courier-Post on September 19. I think it sums up much of the commentary, and I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DIRKSEN SHOWS STATESMANSHIP ON TEST BAN

Senate Republican Leader DIRKSEN is earning increased respect in the Senate by the leadership he has shown on behalf of the nuclear test ban treaty and the way he has cast aside petty partisan considerations to exercise it.

By the same token DIRKSEN has gained stature nationally. Some observers are even comparing him with the late Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, who was so highly esteemed for his statesmanlike cooperation with Democratic administrations in foreign affairs in the post-War II period. Vandenberg was originally an isolationist who came to see isolationism was a mistake, and was man enough to admit he had been in error. DIRKSEN is following the same path.

Some of the Illinoisan's constituents have attacked him for his change of position. A Chicago audience recently indicated disagreement with it but DIRKSEN courageously held his ground. At the end of a prepared speech and a colloquy with the audience, he said, "I came here to take counsel with you and then exercise independent judgment."

The Role of Business and Education in Our Free Enterprise System

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DON H. CLAUSEN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 24, 1963

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, recently I attended the Napa Chamber of Commerce's annual business-education day meeting.

One of the speakers at this event was J. W. Lambert, vice president of personal relations for the Bank of America. In his talk, "The Role of Business and Education in Our Free Enterprise System," he brought up many vitally interesting points about our educational system and how it affects our business world.

I am sure that my fellow colleagues, as well as many other readers, will find Mr. Lambert's remarks thought provoking and of continuing interest.

The address follows:

THE ROLE OF BUSINESS AND EDUCATION IN OUR FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM

Those of us in the business world often forget just how important education is to the free enterprise system which we value so highly. Business and education, after all, have a common heritage and a common job. In business, we are trustees of the great economic resources of our Nation; in education, you are trustees of our great intellectual resources. Neither of us can survive unless the other discharges his responsibilities well.

I think we need only look at our Nation's history to see that thus far we have both done a creditable job. And it is education that takes the first laurels, for without an enlightened citizenry as voters and workers, business could not have adequately discharged its responsibilities to the Nation.

And for this very reason, it is upon education that the burden for maintaining our free enterprise system rests. In the much more difficult and challenging world of the future, education must produce a reasoned, analytical electorate—one which is capable of finding logical, rather than emotional, solutions to the monumental problems which will face our Nation.

We are on the threshold of this world today—an incredibly more complex and fast-moving world than has ever been known in man's history. Demands will be placed upon each of us and upon future citizens that will make some of the great decisions of the past seem almost elementary. Business and science are, by their nature, in the forefront of these changes, but it is education and government which will have to find ways to make use of them and to bend them to the advantage of our people.

In education you have, of course, already been caught up in the wake of some of these changes. A new concept of mathematics is being born, new understanding is growing about the world we live in—its land masses, its oceans, its atmosphere, its physical prop-

erties and laws, and now planets and other worlds in outer space are really coming into focus. So, too, are new concepts growing around government, politics, economics, and many other aspects of our lives.

These are stimulating times if each of us will only face and accept the new challenges as they are presented to us. And we must learn to accept them, for this is just the beginning. We are just starting to gain momentum for the incredible world of the future.

Somehow, we must prepare our future citizens to live in that world—to make decisions, face problems, find excitement and challenges in an environment totally different from that their parents and grandparents were equipped to face. Equipping our future citizens for this fast-moving new world will be the task of education, and a tremendous task it is.

At one time, it was sufficient in a practical sense to teach young people to add and subtract, to read and write. A particularly apt and aggressive young man could leave school around the eighth grade and, with these basic skills mastered, carve an important and vital place for himself in the world. I suppose this still could conceivably happen, but it would be highly dangerous to send young people out into today's world this poorly equipped.

A college education has real plus values—I want to make that point clear. However, our modern reaction to our very fundamental educational effort has been the other extreme—to make a college degree the minimum requirement for real success. I think this phase will pass. It must, because there are not enough colleges nor enough educators to provide this minimum for every citizen, nor is every individual capable or desirous of completing college-level study. And when we finally acknowledge that fact, we will be able to face the challenge of providing the maximum degree of education for our citizens—a sound base of knowledge and reasoning ability—in the years of their grammar and high school careers. To do less is to shortchange the more than half of them who do not go on to college but who must also be prepared to make decisions in this increasingly complex and confusing world.

Just consider some of the problems with which we are faced today which were unknown to our parents; urban sprawl, smog, traffic, allocation of a limited number of tax dollars to a rapidly increasing number of public needs, heavy pressures for civil rights reform, regulation of "big labor" as well as big business, international relations and all the complex related problems of trade, tariffs, balance of payments, disarmament, space law, and many others.

These problems, in both size and number, are increasing at a rate of geometric progression, and it is up to educators to somehow provide our Nation with an enlightened body of citizens capable of grasping the essentials of these issues and making decisions in accord with our Nation's ideals and goals. And it must be accomplished before the student leaves high school.

This, I realize, puts a heavy burden on education, but it is the key to the success of both the individual and our Nation. Each individual must be taught to think in a logical, rational manner—a manner that he can apply to a host of difficult and often confusing issues of extreme importance that

A5990

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

September 24

will face him as a young worker, a businessman, a parent, and a citizen.

Providing this kind of training will require a two-pronged effort.

First, subject matter must be greatly expanded and taught in much more depth. For instance, it is not sufficient today just to teach our own Nation's history, its traditions, its principles, and its goals; we must also teach those of all the principal Nations of the world. Our young people must develop a healthy respect for the ideas of others. No matter how much we may disagree with those ideas, we must learn to appreciate the stresses and conditions which caused them to evolve. Only then are we prepared to intelligently refute them.

The second effort is the teaching of an analytical and rational approach to all knowledge, all problems, and all decisions. Our young people must be taught that it is good to question, and that you must have answers to your questions before you can make an intelligent decision. Many times, as citizens, they will be subjected to arguments of pressure groups—one-sided and very persuasive arguments. They must be taught to seek the other side of each issue. We cannot afford to have the decisions which will govern our lives, our communities, our Nation, and even the world made on a "first come first served" basis—in other words, whoever catches the ear of the electorate first and most convincingly wins its loyalty. These young people must understand that majority rule is only valid when every individual in the majority clearly understands the problem, knows the alternative solutions, and understands the consequences of each potential solution.

H. G. Wells foresaw this point in time some 40 years ago when he wrote, in "The Outline of History": "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." I do not think he overstated the case.

In business today, we understand a great deal more about the problems faced by educators than we once did. We have come to understand that it is no longer enough to hire a man, pay him, and forget him. We do neither ourselves nor our workers justice by that practice.

Today we know we must keep our workers interested. We must present them with challenges and stimulation. We must watch for their special abilities and offer them training with which to develop those abilities. We must see that they progress in accordance with their level of development. What steps more closely parallel the teacher's task than those? Personnel and training have become extremely important functions in today's world of business, and we know we must do these things well if we are to obtain top performance and loyalty from our staff members.

Our Nation needs the same qualities in its citizens if we are to maintain our heritage of free enterprise. It is upon your success at obtaining top performance and loyalty from your students that our Nation's future and its maintenance of freedom depend. And this task will become more and more difficult with each passing year and each scientific advance. Let me give you some examples.

Ours is an extremely prosperous Nation—probably the most prosperous the world has ever seen. Even our lowest income groups are living at a level far above that available to the bulk of citizens in many underdeveloped countries.

But because of our prosperity, it is almost criminal that anyone in this Nation should live a submarginal existence. When we spend billions to train scientists, and to put a man on the moon, how can we justify a miner in West Virginia having to feed his family on Government surplus flour because of the economic fact that oil and gas have largely replaced coal as fuel? What should we do about it, if anything? Should all of these

people be trained in other jobs and transported to better locales? What does the Government owe them? What do those of us in better positions owe them? What do their unions and their former employers owe them? At what point does assistance to these people become "creeping socialism" and at what point is it inhuman to ignore them?

What do we do when every one of our adult citizens owns at least one car and our Nation is becoming one huge concrete pavement? Do we only permit so many cars per family? Do we legislate against pleasure driving at particular hours? And where do they all go on weekends? With an ever-increasing population and more and more land being put to commercial and residential uses, do we pass a law stating that only families with surnames beginning with the letters A through H can go to Yosemite Park on a specified weekend?

Some of these examples may sound far-fetched, but believe me, they are not. They are questions that are already looming on the horizon. And there are even more complex ones looming on the international and spacial scenes. These are the very issues upon which many of the young people in our schools today are going to be expected to decide—basic questions caused by our Nation's prosperity, without precedent, and conflicting with our Nation's basic concepts of individual freedom.

The individual freedoms of each of us are threatened each time Government moves into a new area, and yet increased Government control of various areas will be absolutely necessary in the future. Compromises will have to be made by our citizens—a barter in a way, a scrap of personal freedom here for a privilege, or a desperately needed welfare program there. The issues will not be black and white; there will be shades of gray. It will require a highly intelligent citizenry to maintain the maximum degree of freedom while conferring maximum justice in each of these issues.

In the past, we were allowed a certain leeway in making national decisions. If one turned out to be wrong, it could be changed or righted if enough people demanded. Most issues were not quite so personal and not so many participated in the decisionmaking for that very reason. But governmental actions are affecting our everyday lives more and more; and as they do, more and more citizens will be taking a stand. It is vital that their stands be reasoned ones, not emotional ones. They must be fair and just and well thought out. Because if too many wrong decisions are made, we will all find ourselves with very little individual freedom left at all.

In business we have often been faced with threats against our free enterprise. It was popular 30 and 40 years ago, and with some justification I must confess, to decry all business as venal and unscrupulous. There were abuses by business, to be sure, and governmental regulations were adopted to correct them.

There were two reactions by business. One was to retaliate by decrying government and public opinion. But the vast majority of businessmen were much more logical. They were quick to see that business could very well become the scapegoat for a host of problems it could not control, so it took moves on its own initiative to not merely correct the abuses, but to move ahead and accept its responsibilities to the community and to the Nation. Today I would say that business is as conscious of its responsibilities to the public as is government. Many have fringe benefits far beyond those required by law or demanded by unions. Most firms of any size have scholarship programs or community relations projects of tremendous benefit to the public. Witness institutions such as the Ford Foundation or the Rockefeller Foundation, or our bank's Gannini Foundation. Almost any business of

size has some sort of program to help education or the arts, to encourage its employees to become responsible citizens and to take an interest in civic issues. And these measures were not forced upon business by government regulation or intervention. We have learned to shoulder our responsibilities if we wish to remain free; we have learned that the public welfare is the foundation of the welfare of business.

Education has, from time to time, faced similar threats to its freedom. I think the educational world can point with pride to its battles and its victories in maintaining its freedom. The most recent threat to educational freedom was triggered by the panic after Sputnik. There was agitation for Government to step in to subsidize education of scientists and engineers. Such subsidies, of course, imply controls—controls which educators were determined to fight and fought successfully. I think the education world can be proud of the compromises which finally evolved. But I think the entire situation did our educational system good; it made both educators and the general public aware of the need for accelerated and strengthened education.

I cite these two examples because they are pertinent to each of our fields. But they are good examples of what each American citizen is going to face increasingly in the future. He will have to choose between an invasion of his freedom, or a compromise and acceptance of a responsibility—and few of the choices will be either pleasant or easy.

Throughout history it has always been the most simple solution—in a conflict of ideas or methods—to argue by namecalling and the use of labels and slogans rather than reason. Argument by namecalling and slogans is a luxury we can no longer afford—if, indeed, we ever could. It makes our citizens grist for the mill of any charlatan or demagogue with a clever gift for words or for appealing to the emotions. There are too many vital issues facing our Nation and looming before us to permit anyone to indulge in this lazy, nonthinking attitude. And this is why I believe there must be greater emphasis on analysis and reason in teaching.

In the past, education has risen to meet every challenge presented to it. After generations of teaching by the same methods, education has begun to move and innovate and adapt. Some of the methods have failed, some have been controversial, but all have been part of the sincere effort by educators to prepare our citizens for the world they must live in. As demands upon our educational system become even more stringent and even more vital, I am confident that they will be met with the same determination and willingness you have shown in the past.

To paraphrase Lincoln: The combination of this Nation's free enterprise economy and its historic commitment to education make the United States the last best hope of an earth bubbling with social and technological change.

It is up to us in business and you in education to do the job. I am confident it will be done well.

Thank you.

The Outdoors Will Soon Be Gone

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. EDWARD V. LONG
OF MISSOURI

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, September 24, 1963

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, recently the Public Lands Subcommittee

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A6027

shocked by such uncivilized, excessive, and inhumane punishment, but the Soviet Union has proven itself, again and again, immune to world opinion. Within 2 years, from May 1961 to April 1963, 141 persons were sentenced to death for such offenses. Of those sentenced to death, nearly 60 percent were Jews. If one examines the record carefully, it becomes dismally clear that this is a part of a systemic plan, not only to incite the Russian people against the Jews, as a minority group, but also to deny, to the Jews, their religious heritage and to put them outside the pale of the Soviet Union society. When we realize that almost two million Jews reside in the Soviet Union, we are then aware of the extent of this tragic campaign. For example, in one of the trials, 24 defendants were accused of manipulating the price of apples. Though the majority of defendants were not Jewish, only the Jews received the death sentence. In another trial, a Jew was sentenced to death though he was only an employee of some trade organizations involved; the top officials received only short prison terms.

In all of this campaign, the Soviet press makes certain to implicate the synagogues and rabbis in the alleged offenses. Beyond that, we find the arrest of congregation leaders, the ousting of congregation Jewish officials, and the closing of synagogues. While we cannot deny that all religions are subjected to restrictions in the Soviet Union, only Judaism is singled out for very special denials. While other religions can form national or regional associations, Jewish congregations may not. Religious leaders cannot receive permission to leave the country or to study abroad or to make pilgrimages as other religious leaders make. The Jews are forbidden to manufacture any religious articles such as prayer shawls and phylacteries. Only a very few are permitted to print religious calendars. Training for rabbis has been curtailed until now, in Moscow, only three or four are permitted to attend a rabbinical academy. No Hebrew can be taught nor can any prayer book or Bible be printed in Hebrew. However, the Moslems may use their Arabic for religious purposes as may other ethnic and religious groups use their respective languages. The baking of matzah is forbidden. Without the matzah, no Passover can be properly observed. All Yiddish journals are forbidden; no expression of cultural interest in the Jewish language is allowed. Thus the theaters and the dramatic schools and the publishing houses which use the Jewish language are closed. The old Jewish songs are forbidden. The Soviet encyclopedia, which had devoted 116 pages to the cultural achievement of the Jews, now gives only 2 pages to the Jews. The Jews have been eliminated from the Soviet Union political life. They are excluded from the diplomatic service and from the armed services. A study of the status of Jews in the Soviet Union concludes that the Jews are "deprived of their national and religious rights as a group, and of full equality as individuals."

Soviet oppression and denial of equal rights to its Jewish population has been called "spiritual strangulation."

Yet, withal, the Jews are not permitted to leave the Soviet Union to seek freedom from religious persecution. They are forced to remain while the Soviet Union seeks every way of denuding them of their tradition, of their culture, of their faith in God.

We are gathered today in memorial to the 100,000 who perished at the hands of the Nazis 20 years ago. But it is not enough to mourn the dead; our responsibility now, today, is for the living. Indifferent as the Soviet Union may appear to be to world opinion, such indifference cannot remain if the protests are large and loud enough. Let it not be said that the world condones by

silence. The Jews of the Soviet Union will not relinquish their religion, their heritage, their culture. Hence, the Soviet Union has placed itself directly on the road that leads to genocide.

The Russians make much of their fear of the Germans. In what degree are they different? The Russians have sought to pervert history and, in so doing, have paid service to it because what one seeks to pervert, one cannot forget. History has proven, and proven again, that tyranny bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction for the heart and mind of man, once awakened, finds the bane of oppression intolerable. From Pharaoh, to Hitler, to Khrushchev, the lessons of history loom large. The consequences of tyranny Khrushchev should know will bury him.

We offer prayers for the dead, but we do not forget the living. Let no one forget—whatever his race, his religion, his creed—oppression is a way of life; it feeds on itself yet remains insatiable. When it is aimed at one group, it reaches out to embrace another and yet another. This, too, is a lesson of history none of us can ignore, and I mean, none of us.

Let the religions of the world take note that, in the march of oppression, it is only a matter of on whom it feeds first. There are always the second, and the third, and the fourth, and the fifth until all are engaged. Then it may be too late.

Together we vow there shall be no more "Babi Yars."

Why Nation's Might Halts at State Line

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 19, 1963

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my remarks, I would like to include the following article which appeared in the Washington Post, Sunday September 22. The article, titled "Why Nation's Might Halts at State Line," was written by James E. Clayton, a staff reporter for the Post, in the form of a letter to answer the query of why Federal troops are not dispatched to restore order every time a situation arises such as that in Birmingham. Mr. Clayton's letter is an excellent analysis and I append his article here for the information of the Members of Congress.

The article is as follows:

WHY NATION'S MIGHT HALTS AT STATE LINE

(By James E. Clayton)

DEAR FRIEND: The reasons why there was no Federal troops in Birmingham last week are partly historical, partly constitutional and partly political. Put another way, the reasons are that the President's power to send in troops was doubtful, the use of them would have been contrary to what Americans think is the Nation's tradition and the consequences of their use could have been politically disastrous to the President.

To understand why this is so, you must remember that a national government was established in the United States as the best means of preserving freedom for the individual. To the men who drafted the American Constitution in 1789, and to most Americans today, the greatest bar to that freedom is oppressive government—government so

powerful that it acts for itself, not for the people. The tool of oppressive government is, of course, troops.

TWO INGRAINED FEARS

As a result, two factors—the fear of powerful government and the fear of troops—underlie much of this Nation's system of government and its history. Long before Lord Acton spoke his famous phrase, Americans believed it: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Americans believe those words today.

The American Government is built around that fear of government. The men who wrote the Constitution had suffered abuses of authority during colonial days and they believed that the rights of individuals could be safe only if accumulations of power in government were held to a minimum.

That was why power was divided between three branches of the Federal Government. That was why power was divided between the Federal Government in Washington and the State governments.

That was why the most basic governmental power—to preserve law and order—was denied to the Federal Government.

A SYSTEM OF CHECKS

Recall the words of Montesquieu: "Power should be a check to power." Those words and others of their kind were embedded in the minds of the men who wrote the American Constitution.

The States were to check the National Government, and vice versa; the judiciary was to check Congress and the executive; the executive was to check Congress and the judiciary; Congress was to check the other two.

"The different governments will control each other," wrote James Madison, "at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." This was the argument used in 1789 to persuade the Americans of that day to permit the establishment of an effective national government. It met their fears of strong government and their concern that government would deprive them of hard-won rights.

It is that same fear you hear when there is talk of States' rights or concern that the Federal Government is becoming too powerful. It is that fear which requires a President of the United States to be ready and able to justify in constitutional, as well as political and moral, terms his use of Federal power to suppress domestic violence.

The appearance of massed troops in peace-time on the streets of an American city is abhorrent to most Americans. Troops are for war; police are for domestic violence. And there are no Federal police.

A LOCAL AFFAIR

It was this distaste for troops, this fear of powerful government, that led the men who wrote the Constitution to design for the National Government a national role and to deny it a local role. The National Government was not to concern itself with purely local affairs and the authors of the Constitution regarded law and order as purely a local affair.

The fact that violence in Birmingham is embarrassing to the American Government or is harmful to some American citizens is not, in itself, reason for the Federal Government to override local and State governments. In fact, the Constitution gives the Federal Government no specific power to intervene in situations of domestic violence. The Federal Government does, however, have an obligation to intervene to put down violence if it is asked to by proper State authorities.

But the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, the 14th Amendment and the uncontested actions of Presidents and Congresses since 1792 have given the President more power than that. Presidents have

A6028

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

September 24

used that power to put down domestic violence more often than most Americans care to remember.

Troops (or State militia) were used to put down rebellions in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island in the early days of the Nation. They were used in Illinois during the Pullman strike in 1894 over violent objections of the Governor. They were used more than 30 times between 1917 and 1922 to put down labor strife. They were used during World War II in Government clashes with both labor and management.

But each time troops were used, the public reaction was unfavorable or, at best, mixed.

There are two laws on the books now that permit the President to send troops into a State over the objections of its governor and legislature. One says he can do so if "unlawful obstructions, combinations or assemblages or rebellion" make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States by normal means.

The other says the President can use troops to suppress an "insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy" if it denies to any person equal protection of the laws, obstructs the execution of Federal laws or impedes the course of Federal justice.

These were the statutes invoked by President Eisenhower when he sent troops into Little Rock and by President Kennedy when he sent troops to Oxford and marshals to Montgomery and when he ordered the National Guard to the schools in Tuscaloosa and away from them in Birmingham, Mobile and Tuskegee.

In most of those situations, the President's justification was clear and reasonable in the minds of most Americans. State officials were defying Federal court orders to desegregate schools. They were denying to Negro students equal protection of the laws. They were obstructing the course of justice and making it impossible to enforce Federal law by ordinary means.

In Montgomery, the justification was somewhat different. Marshals were sent because State officials failed to protect interstate travelers (freedom riders). Involved here was another denial of equal protection and, in addition, a failure to protect the federally guaranteed right to travel freely.

In Birmingham the situation is more complex. It is possible to argue, as Negro leaders have, that their people are being denied Federal rights and equal protection; that they are getting no protection at all; that the most fundamental right of all, the right to live, is being threatened. But Birmingham and Alabama officials reply that they are trying to provide protection.

This difference—between making the argument and having it accepted—hits at the key point in the American system of federalism and in the minds of most Americans.

If the President's justification is accepted, it is seen as his effort to protect the freedom of the Nation so zealously guards. If this justification is not accepted, it is seen as a misuse of the power that is his. Such abuse of power reopens all the old fears of Americans about oppressive governments and Federal troops.

Thus, the President, in situations like Montgomery and Birmingham, treads a narrow line. If he acts too quickly, the Nation—not just the southern segregationists—is likely to protest his misuse of power. If he waits too long, if citizens die needlessly, if the Nation is shocked and embarrassed, the Nation—not just the Negroes—is likely to condemn his delay.

The balance between oppressive government and freedom is tenuous. To most Americans, an error on the side of freedom is better than one on the side of oppression.

We Prefer Tax Cut With Spending Curb

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN
OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 24, 1963

MR. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, the President, in his recent speech on the tax cut bill presently before this Chamber, characterized any and all criticism of his fiscal theory of tax reduction without spending control as being both "petty and partisan." This now favorite device of the President was also employed, it will be recalled, to explain the recent cutting back of the foreign aid program agreed to by the House. This is a very clever device for by claiming that all opposition to one's programs is necessarily motivated by personal, political self-interest, no room is left for any reasonable opposition to those programs. It would follow also that one need not discuss or justify the merits of his programs if all alternative programs are by definition without merit. And this, as my able and articulate colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURRIS], so well pointed out, is precisely what the President did. He failed to give the American people any reasoned argument claiming to prove the validity of the very questionable assumptions and presuppositions upon which his novel, depuritanized fiscal theory is based. The President apparently felt either that there were not enough good reasons to justify his theory or that his audience was incapable of properly understanding and evaluating that theory. Fortunately, there are those who are capable of understanding it, and who recognize its dangerous, unsound nature. A case in point is the editorial opinion expressed in the State Journal of Lansing, Mich., on Friday, September 20, 1963.

The editorial follows:

WE PREFER TAX CUT WITH SPENDING CURB

President Kennedy pulled out all the stops in his appeal Wednesday night for public support in his efforts to push his \$11 billion tax cut proposal through Congress.

He aimed his appeal at the entire economic front, portraying the advantages he claims the reduction would have for businessmen and factory workers and other individuals. He also said it would benefit the Nation as a whole by balancing the budget and ending the oversea drain on U.S. dollars.

The President argued a tax cut would mean new markets for American business because citizens would spend an overwhelming percentage of the extra after-tax dollars left in their pockets.

And he mentioned the opportunity for typical families to spend "that extra money on a new dishwasher, or a new spring wardrobe, or a washing machine, or an encyclopedia, or a longer vacation trip, or a down-payment of a new car or a new home."

Kennedy said there are those who for one reason or another "hope to delay this bill—or to attach ruinous amendments—or to water down its effect."

He evidently was referring to those who support a proposed Republican amendment tying tax cuts to curbs on spending.

The President said that no wasteful, inefficient, or unnecessary Government activity will be tolerated on the grounds that it helps employment.

"We are pledged," he said, "to a course of true fiscal responsibility, leading to a balanced budget in a balanced full-employment economy."

"My fellow citizens," he said, "let us not be petty or partisan on matters such as this."

One wonders whether Kennedy means that it is petty to be concerned over the possibly grave effects of a big tax cut without safeguards against mounting Government spending or over a national debt totaling a staggering \$307.8 billion.

"We are talking about the future of our country—about its strength and growth and stability," he said.

Those who favor a tax cut—with curbs on spending—are thinking about the future of the country but also about the adverse effects of an unsound fiscal policy.

It was in many respects an attractive picture that Kennedy painted in his nationwide talk. But it would have been much more attractive had it included his acceptance of effective curbs on Government spending.

TC
Test Ban Treaty Facts Censored

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. STEVEN B. DEROUNIAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 24, 1963

MR. DEROUNIAN. Mr. Speaker, the Moscow test ban treaty was overwhelmingly ratified today by the other body. In a very prophetic article, which appeared in the Long Island Press on September 13, Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott revealed how the Kennedy administration has been censoring the truth on this subject:

PENTAGON CENSORS DETAILS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR GAINS

(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)

WASHINGTON.—Defense Secretary McNamara's censors have succeeded in keeping part of the story of recent Soviet nuclear-missile gains from being publicly discussed in the Senate's historic nuclear test ban treaty debate.

The lid was tightly put on intelligence showing a major Soviet nuclear test breakthrough by the Pentagon's blue penciling of a number of important passages in the highly critical report before it was released this week by Senator JOHN STENNIS' Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee.

The subcommittee's alarming report, outlining the major disadvantages that the treaty will have on U.S. security, has become a rallying point and the bible for Senators opposing President Kennedy's test ban agreement with Russia.

The Defense Department's censoring, which in effect bars subcommittee members from publicly discussing the deleted information, occurred when Senator STENNIS submitted the 25-page report to Secretary McNamara's office for security clearance before making it public.

After checking with the White House, McNamara's aides ordered deleted from the committee's report all information revealing that the Soviets' big yield nuclear tests probed "the ability of radars to acquire and track a missile warhead through the radar

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A6029

and communications blackout created by nuclear explosions."

When several committee members vigorously objected to this unexpected censoring, the Pentagon whiz kids made their blue penciling stick by raising the security issue.

They argued that the Senators' blunt report, unless changed, would give the Russians details on the capability of U.S. intelligence detection system that they do not now have.

While reluctantly admitting that the committee's information about the Soviet gains was accurate and fairly reported, they stressed that its publication would be the first admission by Government sources that the United States had information on the live radar-missile tracking test the Russians made during their superbomb experiments.

When the censors were shown secret testimony of Gen. Thomas S. Power, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, that the United States had never conducted similar experiments, McNamara's aides confirmed that this was true, but were unmoved.

They also admitted that General Power was correct in stating the treaty would bar the United States from holding similar tests. However, they disagreed with the Air Force general's contention that the tests were needed to develop an effective U.S. missile defense system and that the public was entitled to this information.

McNamara's censors also struck from the report data on the antiballistic missile system that the Russians are now deploying around Leningrad, including an intelligence estimate indicating:

That the initial operational capability of the Leningrad system could be achieved in 1963, with 32 antimissile missiles already on launchers.

That this anti-missile-missile system is believed to have attained effectiveness against ballistic missiles fired from 300 to 1,500 miles.

During 1963-64 the Soviets plan to deploy a transportable anti-ballistic-missile system to their army fronts. This system will be effective against all U.S. intermediate range ballistic missiles and those of shorter range.

The Soviet system possibly could, under certain conditions, now defend limited areas of the U.S.S.R. against U.S. Titan and Atlas ICBMs.

In his frank testimony against the nuclear test ban treaty, General Power may have given a sneak preview of what could develop into the major issue of next year's presidential campaign.

A close friend of Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, Republican, of Arizona, General Power is known to have influenced the GOP frontrunner's decision to oppose the treaty by his warning that the Kennedy administration's disarmament approach to peace will actually lead to war.

"In my personal opinion all sensible people in this world desire peace and freedom from a nuclear war," General Power told the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee. "But there are two different theories of how to get there."

"One (theory) is through military superiority and through deterrence, which is the philosophy of the strategy we have used. There is another one through disarmament."

After making it clear he favored the first approach, General Power made it clear that he did not believe that the two theories were compatible, stating:

"I personally think the two theories are diametrically opposed. I don't see how you can arm and disarm at the same time. I have studied previous disarmament measures and in my opinion disarmament is a proven concept to get you into a war. I think history

will prove that the surest way to cause a war, nuclear war or any war, is to disarm."

Senator CLINTON ANDERSON, Democrat, of New Mexico, a strong administration supporter, is urging Senate Democratic leaders to push for a ratification vote as soon as possible. He reported that his mail, which at first was overwhelming for the treaty, has now turned the other way. "The longer the debate goes on," warned ANDERSON, "the bigger the opposition vote to the treaty will be."

President Kennedy is privately trying to swing Senator HENRY JACKSON, Democrat of Washington, a member of the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, to support the treaty. He has talked to Senator JACKSON several times on the phone and conferred privately with him at the White House on Monday.

Top administration officials now believe that the next step in easing tensions with Russia will be to work out an agreement to combine on a moon space program. President Kennedy has made an offer to cooperate in this venture and the Russians are showing an interest in opening negotiations to learn more details about the proposal.

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Either House may order the printing of a document not already provided for by law, but only when the same shall be accompanied by an estimate from the Public Printer as to the probable cost thereof. Any executive department, bureau, board or independent office of the Government submitting reports or documents in response to inquiries from Congress shall submit therewith an estimate of the probable cost of printing the usual number. Nothing in this section relating to estimates shall apply to reports or documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 140, p. 1938).

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